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THE FORTNIGHTLY

FEBRUARY, 1948

GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY

BY R. A. BUTLER, M.P.

CONSERVATISM has no text-book philosophy. It is a faith and a way of life. It is therefore human in its approach and bases its ideas upon the belief that it is the highest and not the lowest motive at will prevail. It cares for the individual as a distinctive personality eking his or her highest point of development. A balance must be ruck between the freedom of the individual and the order necessary for e life of a community. We seek to enable the individual to have free- om for development and only that amount of order which will contribute such development. We reject emphatically any conception that some oup, be they called a party, or planners or technocrats, are the sole ssessors of the gift of knowing what is best for each individual.

It would be humanly impossible, let alone undesirable, for anybody control in detail the many-sided personalities of a nation of nearly ty millions. This brings me to the second feature of the Conservative ea. We stress the immense variety which composes and so greatly engthens national unity. We insist upon the reality and validity of at unity. We seek to unite and not to divide. But it is not a unity sed upon exact uniformity. It is unity based upon the widest variety of alities and ability which it is the duty of society to foster. This variety presses itself through many organizations. We reject any political eory which poses the omni-competent State on one side and the dividual on the other. We see society as composed of a large number organizations, trade unions, trade associations, companies, local vernment bodies, clubs and associations of all kinds through which the dividual can find expression for his qualities and abilities. These ganizations must be fostered and developed rather than suppressed to eate some uniform pattern.

The third feature of Conservatism which I would single out is already plicit in what I have said. I do not in the least attempt to minimize e importance of material progress. Indeed one has only to look around the houses, the social services and the standard of living of the ordinary age-earner before the war to see what was achieved in this direction der Conservative governments. But Conservatives believe that aterial welfare alone is not enough. We must care also for spiritual and oral welfare and for the satisfaction of aspirations as well as of physical ants.

The historical approach is the fourth feature of Conservatism. From

that we derive our intense sense of national unity, our corresponding sense of continuity, our respect for the purposes which underlie our national institutions and our preference for advancing step by step and by developing rather than by revolutionizing.

Order reconciled with freedom, unity founded upon variety, spiritual as well as material values and a sense of historical change. These are the fundamental and distinctive tenets of Conservatism upon which the Industrial Charter is based.

Before we pass on to the more immediate application of those tenets to industry, it is necessary to survey briefly the industrial scene, the environment in which we must work. The most striking feature of British industry is its variety in organization as well as in product. Nearly 200,000 firms are engaged in production in factories and workshops which range from the vast chain belts of mass production to the finest products of the individual craftsman. Even above the factory there is a highly complex range of relationships in trade associations, combines, merchanting and other aspects.

There has until recently been no dogmatism in British industry about forms of ownership. Private ownership has always predominated but that in itself has covered many varieties, from the undertaking of one man who is both owner and worker to companies with many millions of capital and thousands of shareholders. For over a century we have had public utilities privately owned but closely controlled by statute in their capital, dividends, services and methods of operation. We have also had public utilities owned by municipalities. Without thought of being doctrinaire even Conservative governments have experimented with nationally owned bodies such as the Central Electricity Board and the B.B.C.

A less striking feature but one which it would be disastrous to forget is that industry is basically composed of individuals, all contributing their special skills and aptitudes and with their potential magnified many thousand times by the application of power to industrial processes.

It is a fundamental error to believe that this vast and complex machine can be thrust into some strait-jacket of uniformity or that the whole structure is motivated by some single economic motive. Conservatives are not ashamed of the profit motive. On the contrary we believe that it operates as much in the wage system as it does in the reward of capital. But it cannot be said too strongly that as a matter of plain fact neither wage-earners, salary-earners nor owners of capital as a whole are engaged in industry entirely and solely for the money they get out of it. The happiest factory is not necessarily that which pays the highest wages and dividends any more than the most efficient industry is necessarily that which is a great monopoly, State or private.

A nation which prides itself on its good craftsmanship should not be led to act on the assumption that individual pride in good work is not an

effective motive. Nor should a nation which is justly famed for its industrial relations endorse a policy which is based on the idea that money is the only motive and that group relationships inside the factory and the industry count for nothing. Nor should we ignore the compelling motive of responsibility and the desire to measure one's qualities against the highest tests.

We look to industry to fulfil two purposes in the community. First, it must by maintaining the most efficient organization and practice make the greatest possible contribution to the national welfare. Secondly, as a way of life in which a large proportion of the working population spend many hours each day it must provide for the free play of the qualities of each individual.

To confess that private enterprise unaided and uncontrolled will not achieve these results is not to condemn private enterprise out of hand. There is no system of ownership yet invented which will automatically fulfil these purposes. No government department and no public board will automatically reach the maximum efficiency or automatically give the greatest possible scope for individual initiative. Indeed many are beginning to doubt whether recently constituted public boards are even capable of discovering an efficient type of organization. We are judging industry by social and other standards with which economic and technical machinery as such is not concerned.

That is where the primary task of the Government in relation to industry lies. So far as any organization can, the Government, parliament as well as the executive, expresses the general will of the community. It should embody that fundamental national unity in which we believe. In Conservative eyes the Government stands for order and the guardianship of freedom and it acts as the spokesman of the nation. It should uphold the spiritual and moral values of the community and should itself be subject to them. It is the duty of government to preserve and foster the full variety of qualities and abilities in the development of which rests the expression of individual personality. It must preserve that framework of order within which that development can take place.

In terms of industry the Government then has three duties. It must indicate the objects and standards which are demanded of industry. It must assist within its proper sphere everything conducive to greater efficiency of organization and technical practice. It must ensure that everybody in industry undertakes the duties laid upon them and obtains the rights to which they are entitled.

These are the broad principles on which a Conservative government should act. But we must distinguish between these principles and the methods of government. I believe it is the failure to make that distinction that has led some people to identify Conservative policy with that of our political opponents. Methods are a matter of right organization, and when we say that it is the duty of the Government to see that something

is done we do not necessarily mean that it is the task of the Government to do that thing itself down to the last detail.

That distinction is in my view vital to the proper management of our economy and its neglect during the last two and a half years accounts for a part at least of our present difficulties and especially for the inefficiency of administration, for the growth of bureaucracy and for the encroachment upon individual liberty.

The Government has a limited range of functions which it is well equipped to perform. But we Conservatives believe that the actual operation of industry must be left to industrial enterprise itself in all its varied and flexible forms of management and ownership. If the Government takes upon itself power to interfere arbitrarily and capriciously in the daily conduct of industry there will be a confusion of functions and business confidence will be undermined. That is way the present system of controls to-day so greatly hampers industrial enterprise. Industry has to take risks but it takes them in the belief that certain assumptions remain true. Now those assumptions are subject to sudden and arbitrary change and no industry can obtain a clear guarantee of reasonable stability and continuity. There can thus be no confidence and there will be less willingness to take risks. Business confidence is as important for industry as social security is for the employee. Both must be the basis for enterprise and development.

It must therefore be one of the first objects of industrial policy that the Government should give confidence to industry. It must see that industry is kept fully informed with all the available facts. It must maintain stability in international relations and in its own affairs. But above all it must exercise a self-denying ordinance in not asking for power to interfere arbitrarily in industry.

It is within this framework of principles and methods that Conservatives set out in Chapter III of the Industrial Charter our detailed recommendations for government action in relation to industry as a whole and in Chapter IV our proposals for those problems of industry which affect most closely the individual employee. These are comprised in the Workers' Charter to which I will refer later.

The most controversial part of the Industrial Charter was that which dealt with the Government's duties in connection with what is commonly called planning. This is a much used and much abused word. It means different things to different people. To-day I believe that there is a serious danger lest the manifest failure of one particular experiment to put this country on its feet should lead people to condemn every attempt to ensure that the Government has a coherent economic and industrial policy in accordance with the principles outlined above.

For that is what our conception of " planning " is. So long as desires outrun resources, it is important that some arbiter should distinguish between the main objectives which must be achieved and those subsidiary

matters which can be, at need, deferred. A modern government is esponsible for the management of the national monetary system. It also pends a substantial proportion of the national income. By its taxation olicy it can powerfully influence the distribution of the national resources. By its powers to raise and lower tariff barriers it can affect the fortunes of whole industries.

It seems to me merely common sense that, whether the process is lignified by the name of planning or not, these separate aspects of govern- ment policy should exercise a concerted pull in one direction and that that irection must be towards and not away from those major objectives which the community has set before it. Sir Hubert Henderson has ightly pointed out that not all these objectives need be or should be xpressed in long-term quantitative targets. The objective may be to chieve a balance irrespective of the absolute total on either side of the ccount. This would, for example, be true of action to redress a deficit n the balance of payments or to correct inflationary or deflationary endencies.

The statement of these objectives must rest with the Government ecause the Government alone is responsible to Parliament. But they annot be achieved by the Government making some abstract plan, as ve have seen during the past twelve months. The instruments at its isposal even in normal peacetime conditions are very powerful. But ndustry has powerful instruments of its own.

Moreover it is an underlying assumption of our proposals that the overnment must act within the framework of a restored price mechanism. We believe that competitive enterprise operating through the price ystem provides far more effective incentives to efficiency than the existing nechanism of controls. Indeed the effectiveness of the price system is o-day being demonstrated by the pull which is exerted to draw resources nto those activities which are outside controls and which as it happens re among the least essential to national welfare. If as powerful a pull had een exercised to stimulate the most essential activities we should be in ar better case than we are to-day. We are now faced with a much more ifficult task and recovery must necessarily be more gradual. In the last wo years the financial policy of the Government has not accorded with he primary objective of the country. There has been too much planning of he details and no coherent plan for the economy as a whole.

It is from this position that the Conservative Party approaches the uestion of controls. We start from a severe economic crisis which we learly foretold in the Industrial Charter. Our objective is the restoration f the price mechanism. We are not so foolish as to believe that all ontrols can be removed here and now or even that it would be the public vish or indeed consonant with our own principles of social justice to weep away the rationing of essential foodstuffs before supplies were ufficient.

We are, however, firmly of the belief that even within present limitations it would be possible to carry out a marked reduction in the number of controls and a substantial delegation of detailed administration to industry. We see in the present arrangements a persistent tendency for controls to be pushed ever deeper into details and into ever widening circles. The latest manifestation is the deplorable introduction of certain proposals for directing labour, which we hold is a clear instance of an attempt to do by controls what can be done, and in a democracy should be done, by incentives operating through the price mechanism.

That process must be halted and reversed. It has been demonstrated already that it is practicable to reduce the number of different sorts of building materials under control from ninety to twenty-three without any loss of effectiveness. We believe that a careful review of controls industry by industry would reveal many similar instances.

In the long run, controls of this nature must we believe disappear altogether. But this will not absolve the Government from the duty of having a policy nor deprive it of its proper instruments of government. I have already referred to such powerful weapons as monetary management, taxation and tariff-making. Examples of the proper use of these weapons are to be found in the White Paper on Employment Policy prepared by the Coalition Government to which Conservative Ministers were parties. That White Paper assumed the restoration of the price mechanism. But it acknowledged that monopolies and restrictive practices might seriously hinder its effectiveness, restrict that enterprise and initiative which we so sorely need to-day, and obstruct public policy. It was for that reason that we included as an important feature of the Industrial Charter new legislation for dealing with undesirable restrictive practices.

This is one instance in which the Government can rightly exercise its powers to assist the efficiency of industry and where it can lay down certain standards of duties which have legislative force. The Government can equally promote efficiency by stimulating research and in other ways. We also stated in the Charter that in order to preserve industrial stability we did not intend to denationalize certain recently nationalized industries, particularly coal. We did, however, show that we were not prepared to allow a State monopoly to become a cloak for inefficiency and we indicated the broad directions in which we should carry out reforms in those industries. As the results of nationalization became apparent we shall enlarge upon those proposals.

Conservatives are very proud of the part played by their party in building up the social services of the country. Among the most deep-rooted of their traditions is the acceptance of the idea of collective bargaining and the legislation affecting hours and conditions of work in factories. In the nineteenth century it was the Conservatives who championed the rights of the ordinary wage-earner in industry.

The Workers' Charter is in the main current of that tradition. Its

ey-note is that the wage-earner is entitled to be treated as an individual ersonality with a defined status, given certain rights and accepting certain esponsibilities.

In the Workers' Charter we express our belief that industry should rovide three general rights to those engaged in it :

security of employment ;
incentive to do the job well and get a better one ;
status as an individual however big the prices or mechanized the job may be.

We believe that there is a corresponding duty on the employee to do is job to the best of his ability and to participate actively in the life of the ndertaking. This balance of rights and duties is the essence of good eam-work which in itself demands a sense of united purpose among all nose engaged in industry whatever their position.

I am concerned here not with the detailed proposals of the Workers' harter for their own sake, important as these are, but with its effect upon ne relations of government and industry. In this document Conservatives re moving far beyond the range of factory acts and similar legislation. It not too difficult to enact and enforce legislation dealing with measurable hysical standards such as the fencing of dangerous machinery. But in ne Workers' Charter we are moving in the realm of delicate human elationships in all their variety.

It is true that some of our proposals can be the subject of direct legisla- on such as for example the contract of service. But many others, such s the arrangements for joint consultation and those which impinge upon ne systems of collective bargaining, must vary from industry to industry nd indeed from works to works. The small firm has possibilities of irect contact between the managing director and every individual mployee which are impossible for the larger firm where arrangements nust necessarily be formalized. It would be most unwise to exclude any nethod which satisfied all the parties concerned simply on the ground that could not conveniently be classified within the four corners of the legal hraseology of a statute.

There are precedents for dealing with this problem. Our proposal is nat the Government should lay down a code of good practice in these natters. We should seek the approval of Parliament for this code and ndeavour to mobilize in its favour the powerful pressure of public pinion. The Workers' Charter would thus receive the same kind of arliamentary approval as the Highway Code and the Fair Wages Clause. We should in time follow the precedent of the Fair Wages Clause further. A firm which fell below the standard of good practice laid down would ot be entitled to receive any share of the large range of contracts put out o tender by public authorities. In effect the new standards would be ncorporated in government contracts.

Conservatives believe this is a classic instance in which the Government

can lay down standards designed to give the greatest outlet for individual initiative and development while leaving the detailed application to industry itself according to the wide variety of circumstances. We proceed in this way because there is, we believe, a proper sphere for the Government and a proper field for industrial enterprise. It is the duty of the Government to take the grand strategic decisions and to collect the information on which those decisions are based. It should exercise those general powers to which I have already referred. It should in fact create and maintain the atmosphere in which industry can give of its best and set the general aims to which the economy should be guided. It must concern itself with social as well as economic development and lay down, as part of the general aims, the social as well as economic standards which the community expects to be attained.

This broadly is the proper field of government activity in industry. The rest must be left for industry itself in all its diverse and flexible forms of management and ownership. This is very far from *laissez-faire*, because it does not believe that the uncontrolled impulses of *laissez-faire* will inevitably produce the maximum good. It places definite responsibilities upon industry. It is equally far distant from Socialism, because it believes in the power of individual initiative and rejects the doctrine of the omni-competent State.

Our doctrine means that the Government must lay down aims and responsibilities. It must provide in its plans for proper incentives for individual enterprise. Industry must exercise its initiative and ingenuity in carrying out the plans. It must accept responsibility to the community as well as to customers, share-holders and work-people. This is a true partnership, based on a clear division of functions, of strong guidance at the centre and enterprise at the circumference.

BRITAIN AND AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA

By Jack Chen

AT the Moscow Conference in September 1945 the three Foreign Ministers expressed agreement on the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, with broad participation of democratic elements in all branches of that government and for cessation of civil strife. They reaffirmed adherence to the policy of non-interference in Chinese internal affairs. The U.S.S.R. pledged withdrawal of its troops from Manchuria. Mr. Byrnes pledged withdrawal of U.S. forces from China as soon as " responsibility for the disarming and deportation of Japanese troops was discharged."

The Soviet Government withdrew all its troops from Manchuria by April 1946. Since then Soviet relations with China have been diplomatically " correct " and based on strict non-intervention. There have been propaganda stories of " Russian aid to the Chinese Communists " but these all emanate from hostile Chinese anti-Soviet sources and no evidence has ever been advanced to substantiate them. Talk of the Russians "allowing Japanese arms to fall into the hands of the Communist-led armies in Manchuria " can also be discounted. It was certainly no part of the duty of the Soviet Red Army either to disarm the Manchurian guerrillas who had fought the Japanese for fourteen years, nor prevent them from taking over Japanese arms dumps scattered all over Manchuria and in areas where Red Army troops never even appeared. No less than 50,000 Manchurian resistance fighters took part in the final clearing up of the Japanese. The Chiang Kai-shek government has also complained that Nanking troops have not been permitted to enter Port Arthur or Dairen, but the Soviet authorities have stood pat on their treaty rights which entrust the defence of Port Arthur to them and also of Dairen during the term of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and while a state of war exists with Japan—that is, until a peace treaty with Japan is signed. No difficulties have been put in the way of establishment of civilian Chinese administrations at these places. Soviet opinion, as reflected in its press, has not however hesitated to express sympathy for the Communist-led liberated areas of China and its supporters throughout China in their opposition to the admittedly corrupt Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship.

British policy towards China is officially based on the Moscow Conference statement. Answering a written question in June 1947, his last utterance on the subject, Mr. Bevin stated : " Much as we deplore the continuance of the Chinese civil war, we regard it as entirely a Chinese

domestic affair in which His Majesty's Government cannot properly interfere." It is becoming more and more questionable however whether such a statement of policy can stand the test of realism. How long is it possible without courting disaster to treat the Chinese " civil war " as an entirely domestic affair when American policy in China has already passed from a phase of " mediation " to intervention ?

There has become evident an increasingly startling discrepancy between Washington's policy statements and its actions in China. On December 15, 1945, President Truman (working, as is now known, to a draft by General Marshall) issued a detailed and admirable statement on the Chinese question :

> It is the firm belief of this government that a strong and united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of the United Nations Organization and for world peace. A China disorganized and divided either by foreign aggression or by internal strife is an undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and in the future. The United States has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of the sovereign nations. It is thus in the most vital interests of the United States and all the nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their internal differences promptly by methods of peaceful negotiation.

The statement then submitted that the most efficacious method of ending hostilities would be the convocation of a national conference of major political elements to find a solution to internal strife and bring about the unification of the country. It re-affirmed " recognition of the National Government as the only legal Chinese Government—the proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified China."

> United States support will not extend to military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife. The maintenance of peace in the Pacific may be jeopardized if not frustrated unless Japanese influence in China is wholly removed and unless China takes her place as a unified and peaceful nation. This is the purpose of the maintenance for the time being of U.S. military and naval forces in China. The U.S. Government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves and that the intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate.

The statement also made clear that " as China moves towards peace and unity along these lines described above," the United States " would be prepared to assist in every reasonable way in rehabilitation . . . to give favourable consideration to China's requests for credits and loans under reasonable conditions for projects which would contribute towards the development of a healthy economy throughout China and healthy trade relations between China and the U.S.A."

General Marshall was sent to China as President Truman's Special Envoy to implement this policy, in the first place by mediating a settlement between the Kuomintang and the Communist Parties and other elements. This settlement was actually reached at the All Party Political Consultative Conference of January 1946. But hostilities broke out on a nation-wide scale six months later in July. General Marshall left China finally in January 1947 admitting that his mediatory efforts had failed. It is a

.ct however that large amounts of American aid in various forms were iven to the Kuomintang government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek roughout this period—from V.J. Day onwards down to the present. n other words American intervention continued side by side with merican mediation. The Chinese Communist Party in fact claims that eneral Marshall's mediation was in fact little more than an attempt to ain time for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to mount his offensive gainst the Communist-led liberated areas. However that may be, it is enerally recognized that the Generalissimo would not have launched is offensive unless he had obtained previous U.S. aid and ad hopes of this aid being continued. In actual fact he succeeded in ıpturing over 150 of the county towns in the liberated areas with troops rgely trained by the Americans, equipped and transported by them or on ehicles provided by them.

The American estimate of a total of over 4,000,000,000 U.S. dollars orth of American aid given to the Generalissimo's government after .J. Day is not challenged. This includes a loan of $66,000,000 in 1946, 900,000,000 worth of Lend-Lease supplies, surplus war supplies valued over $500,000,000 in payment of a $174,000,000 reverse Lend-Lease ebt, and a gift of 271 naval vessels. Immediately the Japanese army ırrendered, 80,000 of Chiang's troops were flown in to take over Japanese-eld cities in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of local esistance fighters. Later, more than 300,000 of his troops were moved nto north China and Manchuria in American ships where they were eployed against liberation army forces. The Nanking Government, espite solemn promises concerning " non-discrimination ", has received inety-eight per cent. of all the UNRRA supplies sent to China although ne Communist-led areas contain over sixty per cent. of the people entitled o receive UNRRA aid, and UNRRA in China is of course subject to Vashington control. Since General Marshall left China further American id has been received by the Chiang government. This includes a sale of 30,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition at a tenth of its cost (June 1947); $27,700,000 grant for the purchase of " relief supplies " ; an educational rant of some $20,000,000 dollars, allocations of surplus American war naterials from marine dumps in North China and, finally, the interim Marshall Aid " of $18,000,000 (December 1947). Throughout this me the U.S. Military Advisory Group in China, numbering at present ome 750 officers and men, has been advising Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's army and assisting its training.

There are groups in America such as those represented by Mr. Henry Vallace and the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern policy who trenuously oppose American intervention in China and demand a return o the December 1945 statement of Truman policy, but official American iscussions centre not on the merits of intervention or non-intervention ut only on the extent and direction of intervention. Mr. Marshall, for

instance, has suggested that $60,000,000 immediate emergency aid was needed by Chiang's government with a total programme of $300 millions to be spent at the rate of $20 million a month. Mr. Bullitt, in October, called for an immediate grant of $75,000,000 and a three year total of $1,350,000,000 for the Nanking Government to " prevent China falling into the hands of Stalin." He proposed that General MacArthur be appointed Personal Representative of the President, to plan a joint campaign with Generalissimo Chiang against the liberated areas which now comprise a third of the population and over a quarter of the country. Speaking before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Marshall aid to the Nanking Government, Lt.-General Wedemeyer, who has recently returned from China as President Truman's Special Envoy but whose official report is still on the secret list, called for military aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek not because it was needed for Chinese reconstruction but " to oppose Communist aggression ", because " it does not matter whether Chiang is a benevolent despot—which he is— or a republican or democrat. The fact is, the man has fought Communism all his life." Speaking before the same committee, Representative Judd insisted that large scale aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was a necessary corollary of the United States policy of opposing " Russian expansion in Europe." It is hardly necessary to stress how far removed such views are from the statesmanlike policy enunciated in 1945.

The truth about the situation in China is available in the United States—and has in fact been available for a long time. During the war with Japan many able members of the American military mission, many diplomats and journalists visited both the Kuomintang-controlled areas and the Communist-led liberated areas and brought back factual accounts of both. Mr. Guenther Stein wrote in his *Challenge of Red China* :

> By the side of the internationally recognized and nurtured China of the Kuomintang, the wild growth China of the Communist initiated Democracy has come to stay—no matter whether it gains from the defeated enemy much or little of the territories he held between the Communists' Anti-Japanese War Bases ; no matter whether its share in the Japanese heritage of arms and munitions is greater or smaller than that of the Kuomintang ; no matter whether or not it remains blockaded and isolated from the outside world.
>
> Its fundamental strength lies not so much in territory, arms, and outside supplies as in the fact that the New Democracy answers the needs of the Chinese people and solves its problems.
>
> This progressive reform system has gained for the Communists and their leading United Front collaborators a degree of active mass support such as no régime in China has ever been able to obtain. More than that : the people have come to regard that system as their own. They will, if need be, fight in its defence.
>
> Chiang Kai-shek's armies, even if they were equipped with foreign arms, would be no more likely to succeed against that combination of Communist-led troops and politically conscious people than hundreds of thousands of well-equipped Japanese troops did during eight years of incessant war and terror.

The drift of Washington towards intervention in China began when General Joseph Stilwell was dismissed his post as Allied Chief-of-Staff to

e Chinese armies. General Stilwell, a Roosevelt nominee, was one of ose Americans who thought that the " two Chinas " could be brought gether but only if it were made plain that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ould get no aid for civil war. He was no " pro-Communist " but, like any Americans who know China, he realized that the Chinese Communists d their un-armed liberal allies of the Democratic League, were eager for " ballot-box battle " which they were sure that they would eventually in and that it was the Generalissimo who feared a popular vote. Stilwell lieved that the United Nations were fighting for democracy, that the ommunists' agrarian reform was essential for Chinese economic progress d that normal peacetime, democratic conditions and expanded industry d trade would bring about a rapid development of a solid, moderate iddle class vote in China. But General Stilwell was dismissed his post der pressure from the Generalissimo. Brooks Atkinson of the *New ork Times* commented : " Inside China it represents the political triumph a moribund, anti-democratic régime that is more concerned with aintaining its political supremacy than in driving the Japanese out of hina. The Generalissimo is determined to maintain his group of aging actionaries in power until the war is over when, it is commonly believed, e will resume his war against the Chinese Communists without distrac- on." (October 31, 1944).

After General Stilwell's departure, American policy in China was etermined mainly by General Patrick Hurley, Roosevelt's personal epresentative and General Albert Wedemeyer, commanding the U.S. orces there. General Hurley also believed the " two Chinas " could be rought together but only by giving increasing aid to Chiang and so forc- ng the Chinese Communists to compromise. Many able experts on hina in the U.S. State Department who disagreed with him were forced o resign or were transferred to other departments.

On June 28, 1945, warning against the drift towards increasing involve- ent in the Chinese civil war that Chiang was then already planning, Valter Lippman wrote in the *New York Times* :

> There will be no peace in Eastern Asia if civil war breaks out in China after the defeat of Japan. The Chinese civil war is not a purely Chinese affair ; it is a threat to the peace of the world. The United States, out of loyalty to an ally . . . and for military reasons in this war (against Japan) is giving full support to the Chungking Government. It is committed to taking a leading part in assisting the reconstruction of China and its industrialization. But the United States can have no interest in building up the military power of Chungking in order that it may then wage civil war after the Japanese war is concluded. That could hardly fail to bring Chungking into conflict with the Soviet Union, and to entangle the United States in that conflict.

Despite these warnings however Washington's involvement in China's ivil war continued with aid to Chiang's government.

So far the results of this American aid have been disastrous for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. American assistance in the transport f troops, training and equipment made him over-confident. In an

attempt to fight a " blitzkrieg " he made extensive early gains but uneconomically expanded his material and manpower and distributed his forces over too wide an area. Depending on foreign aid his régime has neglected to mobilize to the full its own resources—it has indeed shown itself to be incurably corrupt—and at the present moment is faced with the loss of all Manchuria and north China. The People's Liberation armies are now consolidating their advances in Central China and have now penetrated into South China. If his régime was unpopular before it is even more so now. Nationalist opinion in China is strong. Increasing numbers of former supporters object to the dominant rôle played by American advisers and pro-American elements in the Nanking government. In his attempts to suppress all opposition Chiang has banned all opposition parties, has re-introduced wartime censorship and controls, intensified the fascist or authoritarian aspects of his régime, expanded the activities of the secret police. Many brutal murders of liberals and students have been reported. The economic situation is catastrophic. The sudden influx of large amounts of " surplus " American goods has unsettled and unbalanced markets. With over half the import-export trade with America there is a disproportionate dependence on dollar exchange and a dollar famine consequent on a large adverse balance of trade ($600 million in 1946 and a possible $400 million in 1947). The inflationary spiral is a vivid indication of the extent of the crisis. In January 1947 one U.S. dollar was worth 3,500 Kuomintang dollars. In December 1947 the rate rose to 166,000 Kuomintang dollars. Compared to 1936, prices have increased 140,000 times. Agricultural and industrial production and trade continue to decline. The enormous civil war expenditure, and increasing tax burdens on an ever decreasing number of tax-payers have thrown government finances completely out of gear and increased civil discontent. It is no wonder that the Nanking Minister of Economic Affairs discussing proposed Marshall aid said : " Not $300 millions but $3,000 millions are needed." It is not surprising that American military men believe that aid even on this scale would have to be accompanied by a " reform " of the Nanking régime under American supervision in all major branches and with American advisers attached to the Nanking armies at much lower levels than at present.

In view of the advances of the Communist-led People's armies and the approaching prospect of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's complete collapse, some of the most influential groups in Washington, represented by the Luce press group and Mr. William Bullitt, now advocate a strengthened Japan under American control as the main bulwark of American influence in the Pacific. China would be subordinated to this conception and relegated to the status of a " holding operation " or strategic " glacis ". General Wedemeyer is known to advocate immediate and resolute American intervention to maintain Chiang's hold on North China while reserves are mustered in South China and Formosa for a

anter-offensive. These proposals are all frankly directed against the inese Communists and their allies in every quarter inside China, including : Democratic League liberals and the progressive members of the Left uomintang. It is proposed in fact that American intervention in China ould be used quite openly to suppress all opponents of an admittedly rrupt and unpopular régime which is to be subordinated to American ategic considerations in the Pacific. If it were successful it would ng American-led, trained and equipped armies on an anti-Communist asade northwards to the Siberian borders of the U.S.S.R. But the hteen months of civil war in China indicate that these plans seriously derrate the resources at the disposal of the Communist-led liberated eas.

Official British policy towards China has thus far been based on the oscow Conference agreement of September 1945 but it has supported nerican diplomacy on the assumption that the United States was trying implement the Truman declaration of December 1945. Thus it was at at the second Moscow Conference in March 1947 Mr. Bevin supported r. Marshall in opposing Mr. Molotov's request for a discussion on the plementation of the 1945 Agreement. Mr. Molotov contended that e Soviets had carried out their undertaking to withdraw all troops from anchuria and abstain from intervention in China's affairs. It was own then that the liberated areas of China and all the democratic groups ould have welcomed another chance for an all-round settlement of the vil war. The Nanking Government however was then receiving nsiderable American aid and was hopeful of a quick victory. It opposed ch a discussion for obvious reasons. British diplomacy, acting on a lse premise, missed a great opportunity to give good advice and leader-ip at a crucial moment in Pacific affairs. Since then the situation has eteriorated rapidly. The Chinese people have been subjected to eighteen onths of civil war following on eight years of foreign invasion. eneralissimo Chiang Kai-shek's régime has become so unpopular that e democratic bloc in China has stated that it will not tolerate its reten-on or influence in any form. Its position is critical and entirely dependent n American aid. The United States has become further involved in the eneralissimo's disastrous civil war adventure. Great resources have een squandered and precious time has been lost in the task of Chinese habilitation, with consequent losses to British trade in the Pacific. The me has clearly come for British diplomacy to subject events in the acific and in China to the closest and most realistic scrutiny and to e-orientate its policy accordingly.

AMERICAN AID TO THE MIDDLE EAST

By Hans Heymann

STRANGELY enough, the generosity of the American people, and their willingness to accept the sacrifices which the Marshall programme entails, do not appear to be founded on a clear conception of what it actually implies, or what its real objectives are. The general confusion has been aggravated by the political necessity of selling the programme to Congress principally as a national security measure directed against Communism. The negative aspect of the policy has thus been over-emphasized at the expense of its positive features—the objectives of recovery and reconstruction. Consequently, there exists no clear distinction in the minds of many between a short-term programme of emergency financial aid to a government to strengthen it, and prevent it temporarily from succumbing to communist pressure, and a long-term programme of multi-national co-operation leading toward the general economic recovery of an entire world region and placing it permanently on a sound footing.

The many influential groups in and out of Congress who argue in favour of " aid " to the Far East and Middle East in the same breath as they demand " aid " to Europe, are suffering from " muddled thinking ". Unfortunately they ignore the existence of an antiquated social structure typical of the over-populated backward areas of the Far and Middle East. It is the anachronistic feudal structure of society in these areas that prevents any material aid America might send from reaching those for whom it was ultimately intended : the broad masses of the people. Americans find it difficult to undertsand that in these areas there exists no liberal or conservative middle class, no reasonably prosperous farm population, no high-wage skilled labour force ; in fact none of the elements that make for social and political stability. And they do not realize that any financial help sent to such areas is inevitably dissipated in the form of graft and wasted in bolstering an already oppressive régime. Such aid would merely deepen the cleavage between ruler and ruled, would widen the gap between the very wealthy and the very poor and would do nothing to place the area on a sound economic footing. Thus, far from strengthening these areas against the threat of Communism, America would actually be playing into its opponents' hands by stacking the cards in favour of a revolutionary explosion.

This pattern has already emerged in China, Turkey and Greece, where America's economic assistance has failed to win it a single friend among

those who have always been democracy's only ally—the people ; but much to its embarrassment it has won America the allegiance and admiration of the dying remnants of a hated feudal order, the traditional forces of reaction.

On the other hand, in the case of the Marshall Plan countries of Europe the situation is different. These countries enjoy reasonably effective democratic governments and a social organization compatible with national economic recovery. An integrated plan of mutual self-help, supplemented by an adequate flow of vitally needed capital goods from the U.S., has every chance of succeeding in the restoration of a sound European economy. Such a Europe can become a new world balancing power, contributing greatly to the stability of the present precarious two-power system.

Clearly then, at any point on the globe, two conditions are necessary for the success of any American measure of aid and reconstruction. The first necessity is that the region must have a social and political organization able and willing to carry out the drastic planning measures that a development programme demands. The second is that it must be a genuine long-range development programme, planned as part of a major co-operative regional effort of self-development ; it cannot simply take the form of sporadic unconditional stop-gap financial assistance to tottering governments. Obviously, in the case of the Middle East, the first condition is totally lacking and, in its absence, there can be no attempt to provide the second.

It must be concluded therefore that a Marshall Plan for the Middle East is neither economically practicable nor politically feasible. Moreover it is now apparent that a policy of granting *carte blanche* assistance to anti-communist governments is a self-defeating expedient.

In the face of this dilemma it is difficult to see what positive policy America can adopt in the Middle East. For it is not simply a question of how the United States can secure its own interests in the Middle East. Such a question could be answered fairly easily in terms of strategy. The question is rather one of how the Middle East can maintain itself as a more or less independent factor in the world power scale, without falling under the unilateral domination of either East or West. That question involves much more than the relative strategic positions of the outsiders holding sway in the area ; it involves the whole complexity of social and economic conditions of the area itself, which, after all, determine its ability to survive in the cross currents of conflicting power ambitions.

It has been officially stated that American policy in this area is based on the assumption that its interests and the cause of peace are best served by the preservation of the Middle East as an area of sovereign independent States free from outside pressure or political influence. If its policy is based on this assumption, it would be pertinent to ask whether these countries, left politically to their own devices, would be able, for long, to

maintain that independence or whether there were forces within this area which would cause it to gravitate toward one or the other of the interested outside powers. This question, crucial though it is for the success of American conduct, does not generally receive sufficient attention. America's preoccupation with the strategic factors has made her indifferent to the existing local social patterns and the decisive effects they might have on the outcome of the power contest itself.

II

On a first impression, the vast triangular land-mass known as the Middle East appears to be an area of infinite diversity and disunity, divided as it is on political, linguistic, religious and racial lines, held apart by tangled systems of mountains, plateaux, deserts and fertile tracts, and criss-crossed by an endless variety of unabsorbed minorities. Middle Eastern life is further split by social and economic divisions. The nomad herdsman, at the bottom of the cultural scale, is politically the least stable element in Middle East society. The marginal peasant, steeped in stultifying tradition, forms the major base of this society. Finally, the cosmopolitan townsman, the core of a new middle class, is at the centre of modern political life.

These obvious dividing forces tend to obscure an underlying unity that binds life in the Middle East together and gives it a common orientation toward the outer world. In part this unity is due to geography, in part to history, and in part it is the result of a community of experience in the modern world. Geographically the entire area represents a bridge between Europe and Asia and this function places it squarely astride the lines of communication between East and West. Historically the basis of this unity lies in the great heritage from the past, when the Middle East for centuries was the uncontested political ruler and when Persian, Byzantine, Egyptian, Syrian and medieval Moslem civilization provided brilliant cultural leadership to the entire civilized world. The pervasive influence of the Moslem religion and the predominance of the Arabic language provide an additional and enduring bond. With common roots in the past, the peoples of the Middle East thus view the modern world in a common focus and their social attitudes have tended to develop in a uniform pattern.

At the core of their new political consciousness lies the desire of the people themselves to direct the course of their development. But the development of the intellectual and technical potentialities of the Oriental masses raises tremendous problems. It is not sufficient to think in terms of raising levels of education, vocational training, health and hygiene. These measures would certainly lead to advances in methods of farming but such State services are too little and too slow to produce the far-reaching changes that must be made in the economic and social structure of the Middle Eastern countries. What is needed is an aggressive and

rapid development programme which must include a radical reform of land tenure and taxation to re-distribute the national income, for it is the age-old communal inequality that has kept the rural masses in abject ignorance and poverty. The programme must aim at raising productivity and increasing the area under cultivation through irrigation, for it is lack of water, rather than poor soil that is the cause of infertility here ; and finally, it must provide a workable plan of limited industrialization, for it is in the increase of " secondary " production that the greatest opportunities for economic advancement lie.

These are some of the aspirations and some of the needs of the peoples of the Middle East. It is clear that they cannot be met by the existing social structure, which admits of no close contact between the State machinery and the masses. In the absence of governments that are prepared to identify themselves with a vigorous programme of economic development, and in the absence of any understanding on the part of the possessing classes of the need for such a programme, how can this society lift itself out of its rut ? Surely no outside aid, no Marshall Plan can strengthen such States as long as the governing groups will not permit their peoples a chance to share in the development of their own countries.

It is well to keep in mind, therefore, that the Middle East is an area of almost catastrophic instability, growingly conscious of internal injustices and by no means insensitive to the actions of foreigners. Moreover, people living under such conditions, are exceedingly receptive to vigorous ideologies. It would be short-sighted to ignore the part that ideology played for example, in inspiring the Tudeh Party of Iran to accept aid from the Soviet Union. In the Middle East, national groups who despair of achieving equality within their existing boundaries may well turn to a foreign power in the hope of achieving independence through separation. Russia offers attractive prospects for such hopes, for at least in her own nationalities policy, the Soviet Union has made a remarkable record.

III

The extent of America's interest in this vital area is indicated by the fact that the Middle East contains, in proven reserves, almost as much oil as the Western Hemisphere which, until recently, had been regarded as the world's only great oil reservoir. With ever growing world requirement and the urgent strategic need of conserving domestic oil resources, U.S. plans call for the importation by 1951 of at least forty per cent. of our domestic oil consumption. This places the vast oil deposits of the Middle East in a particularly crucial position and it is quite understandable that the Department of State has decided, for the first time, to extend active support and diplomatic protection to private investors in this area.

But this decision raises a number of problems both for American

domestic and foreign policy. As for domestic policy, the State Department has expressed its concern over the fact that five major companies dominate the oil picture in the Middle East, and it is anxious to avoid being accused of " working for a few large companies ". Hence it would like to see U.S. participation in Middle East oil placed on a broader base and has encouraged American " independents " to enter the field. In foreign policy, the problem is how the vast natural treasures of the Middle East are to be exploited and how the benefits from their development are to be shared between the investor that produces them and the nation that owns them. This is not a new problem, in so far as it has been a delicate issue ever since " imperialism " became a dirty word. But it is especially crucial now in the light of indigenous sensitivities. That the State Department is conscious of its responsibilities in this respect, became apparent in a recent cautiously worded warning : " . . . American oil operators abroad may have to revise their thinking on the form of certain arrangements. It may no longer be possible to operate abroad as it has been in the past."

In all fairness it must be stated that American oil men themselves have not been indifferent to this caution. They remember all too clearly the painful nationalizations and expropriations of their investments in various countries, under the theory that their enterprises were operated on the vampire or octopus principle, with no benefits accruing to the natural owner of the resources. In their operations, oil men have been paying increasing attention to the question of transforming the one-way pipeline of exploitation into a two-way pipeline of mutual benefit and development. But at the same time this movement has not gone nearly far enough. It is true that the various installations, including buildings, roads, hospitals and schools built for the oil development workers, have benefited the local populations somewhat, but the bulk of the local benefit still goes to the feudal ruler in the form of royalties. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the $75,000 daily income from Aramco production (Arabian—American Oil Co.) is the personal " take " of King Ibn Saud. It is not national wealth in any sense of the term.

In marked contrast to this situation stands the recently announced Liberian development plan of Stettinius Associates which provides, among other benefits, that ten per cent. of profits shall be paid into a fund devoted to the educational and technical advancement of the Liberian people.

In 1946 Aramco profits amounted to more than $5 million on total sales of about $18 million, and so it would seem that it should be at least financially possible for oil companies to adopt a similar far-sighted policy. Admittedly, the positive benefits of such a policy are limited. It will not transform the nation into an advanced country, it will not bring about its economic development, but, apart from being a moral policy, it will benefit a great number of people directly and so will have a psychological

mpact far more significant than the sacrifice of profits involved.

It is not contended that a more liberal attitude by private investors is the key to Middle East stability. But under existing conditions of great power discord, it is about the extent to which America can act positively to improve its standing with the people of the Middle East. In the longer run of human events, this is even more important that America's standing with their ruler. Again and again the diplomatic tug-of-war has demonstrated the advantages of the appeal to the people ; again and again it has revealed the vulnerability of the oppressor. Neither impatience with obstructionism, nor fear of Communism, neither ambition for power, nor zeal for profits must make America blind to the needs of the greatest force in any society—the people. The United States and the Soviet Union are evenly matched in the Middle East. America's policy and conduct must speak for themselves. They must prove to the exploited and to the oppressed that there is something that can mean more to them than the revolution of a Lenin—it is the revolution of a Washington. Transforming the one-way stream of nineteenth century exploitation into a two-way passage and placing the Middle East at the receiving as well as the giving end of the pipeline may go a long way.

(*Dr. Heymann is Professor of Economics at the Associated Colleges of Upper New York.*)

LIVING TOGETHER IN EUROPE

By G. D. H. Cole

DEMOCRACY evidently does not mean the same thing to Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotov, to Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin—to say nothing of Mr. Churchill—and to Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes. Indeed, they seem to mean by it things so different that one is tempted to wonder whether there is any common core in their several uses of the word—which, nevertheless, they all invoke again and again as the very foundation of their aspirations for a settlement of European affairs. Even if we cannot hope to resolve the differences, let us at any rate begin by trying to see as clearly as we can what they are, as a means to better understanding of the disputes that centre round them and of the bearing of these disputes on the future of European society.

It is perhaps easiest to begin by observing how differently we ourselves use the word " democracy ", even in relation to our own country. Thus it is almost equally possible to say either that Great Britain is a democracy because its government rests upon the result of a popular vote or that Great Britain is not a democracy because there exist among the British people so large differences of class and wealth, involving differences of power and prestige, as to amount to a denial of the democratic spirit. Again, it is quite possible to say, and to be understood in saying, that Scotland or the North of England is more democratic than the South of England, though obviously the word ' democratic ' in such a connection has nothing to do with the institutions of government, which are common to all parts of Great Britain. The word is here being used in a social as distinct from a political or economic sense. It has to do with manners and feelings rather than with any formalized institutions such as Parliament or the structure of economic enterprise. Or take the position in the United States. When the Americans claim to be the most democratic people on earth they are, I think, using the word in a mixed sense that in one of its aspects comes fairly close to the usage that I have just employed. They mean for one thing that, in the United States one man thinks himself in a limited but important sense as good as another and a possessor in some sense of " equal rights " as a man, not merely " before the law " but also at the bar of custom and accepted social behaviour. This part of their feeling that they are democratic has not a great deal to do with their political institutions, and has still less to do with the actual structure of their economic life. Or perhaps, I should say that even if it has to do in part with their political institutions it is not mainly concerned

with them ; for the American, though he prides himself on his Constitution, is very apt to think of democracy as " a way of life " which consists to a very great extent of not being governed at all, rather than of being governed in one way as against another.

The American has, however, another thing also in his mind when he thinks of his country as a democracy. He thinks of democracy as involving differences of view, organized to some extent in political parties, but more and even mainly in a wide variety of pressure groups through which public opinion gets formulated and expressed. He believes that the existence of contending parties and of conflicting pressure groups is an indispensable part of the equipment of the spirit of democracy ; and he cannot imagine that any country which is without them can be worthy to be called democratic. He thus appears to stand for the old liberal creed of freedom of speech and organization ; but in fact he qualifies his belief in liberty with the far-reaching condition that it must not find vent in " un-American " activities. He believes in freedom to speak and write and organize within the limits set by what he calls " the American way of life." Anything branded as " un-American " is outside the pale of freedom, and merits only to be suppressed. But, within the pale, differences of view are to be not merely tolerated, but welcomed, at any rate in theory, as manifestations of the spirit of democracy.

As against all this, when the leaders of the Soviet Union speak of democracy, the word has for them a quite different associative content. This content is primarily neither political nor social, but economic, as indeed it is bound to be in view of their Marxist philosophy, which treats the economic factors as primary and everything else that relates to man's social affairs as either derivable from the economic factors or, if not, of quite secondary importance. Thus, regarding democracy primarily in economic terms, the Soviet leaders judge of the quality of social institutions first of all by looking at the structure of property relations, above all at the conditions governing the ownership of land and of the essential instruments of production. In their view, a society is truly democratic if in it the land and the other main instruments of production belong to the people, and not to any privileged class, and on no other basis. Democracy implies to their minds an absence of classes based upon the ownership and exploitation of property, or at all events of property beyond the point at which it can be used personally without the employment of hired labour being necessary to its enjoyment or made a means to the extraction of ' surplus value ' from its use.

This is basically what democracy signifies to any communist, in the Soviet Union or elsewhere. There is, however, a further part of the meaning of the word, corresponding to the second part of the American meaning. Democracy, I have said, implies, in the Soviet sense of the term, ownership of the essential instruments of production by the people. But who are the people ? They are thought of not, as both British and

Americans tend to think of them, as a number of individuals, each with his own particular attitude to common affairs, but in terms of economic classes—landlords, capitalists, *petty bourgeoisie*, workers and peasants—among whom only the two last, workers and peasants, have any claim to be regarded as representing the people who should own and control, or on whose behalf ownership and control should be exercised. These classes, not the individuals who are included in them, are on the Soviet view the real social forces ; and the democratic or undemocratic character of a system is to be judged, not by the scope it allows to parties or pressure groups, but by the degree to which its institutions succeed in expressing the collective will of the worker and peasant classes—or in practice rather of the working class, which is usually thought of as the natural leader of the combined worker-peasant democracy. On this view, the class being regarded as one, and the individuals as mere components of the class, there can be only one correct class-policy, and therefore only one democratic policy. All divergences are undemocratic, as soon as they come to be, not arguments about what ought to be done in a situation in which policy is still undefined, but differences persisted in when policy has been decided. Such persistence, which we accept as a fine exemplification of democratic freedom, is on the Soviet view essentially undemocratic. It is contrary to the doctrine of democratic centralism, which proceeds directly from the view that the class and not the individual is the significant social reality.

The struggle that is now going on over a large part of Europe is in its essence a struggle between these rival conceptions of democracy. But is it, as the Soviet leaders choose to picture it, really a struggle between the American conception and their own, or is there a third conception differing from both, which can be regarded as characteristic in some degree of the countries we are accustomed to group together under the designation of Western Europe ?

Let me ask first what we in Great Britain, and particularly those of us who belong to the Labour Party or to the ' left ' in some form, mean when we speak of democracy in relation to our own and to current European affairs ? I think our traditions lead us to regard the matter more perhaps than any other people primarily from a political point of view. We think of democracy first and foremost in terms of parliament and of other representative central institutions, though we may also bring in, in a secondary place, other institutions such as town and county councils, and maybe even voluntary societies such as trade unions, co-operative societies and, if we are nonconformists or of nonconformist stock, dissenting congregations. If we regard Great Britain as a democratic country, we do so in the main because it is governed by a cabinet which depends upon a parliamentary majority, which depends in turn upon the votes of the people under a system that comes very near to equal and universal adult suffrage. We may also be quite conscious

hat our possession of democracy in this sense does not mean that we .re democratic in other senses. We may recognize that our economic ystem rests on highly undemocratic foundations ; that there is much nobbery and much acknowledgment in all classes of class differences ; nd that power is in fact very unevenly distributed in relation to any listribution of it that could conceivably be regarded as consistent with lemocratic principles. Nevertheless, most of us regard these undemo- ratic characteristics of British society as secondary, in the sense that they ıre capable of being corrected (that is, if we wish them to be corrected) by he use of our democratic political institutions. Parliament, we think, can egislate to alter the economic relations that prevail in society and can ıffect the social relations by such methods as altering the educational ystem so as to provide less unequal educational opportunities for all and hus render the conditions of political activity less unequal too. Most of us thus tend to think of political democracy, if not as complete in itself, nevertheless as the main instrument to be used in realizing all-round lemocracy ; and accordingly, when we are faced with the practical problem of establishing democracy in those parts of Europe in which t has been destroyed by Nazi domination, as in the British zone of Germany, we tend to think of establishing political democracy first of ll and then, after our own fashion, of watching the Germans use the lemocratic political instrument they have been helped to create for the ourpose of settling up democracy in other fields.

To Stalin, or indeed to any communist, this view can only appear quite antastically wrongheaded. For, in the communist view, if you want all- round democracy, the first thing you have to do is to lay sound economic oundations for it by taking the land and the other key instruments of roduction out of the hands of private persons who can use them for xtracting 'surplus values' and by transferring them either to public owner- hip or, where this is socially impracticable, to some form of popular owner- hip that will preclude their being used for purposes of class exploitation. All over Eastern Europe, the first thought of the Soviet leaders has been to reak up the great landed estates and to transfer the main industries to ublic ownership and operation. Where this has not been done, it seems o them to be quite meaningless to establish parliaments chosen by niversal suffrage and to expect such institutions to yield democratic esults. The political instrument, they hold, can serve democratic ends nly where the economic foundation on which it rests has been already ransformed and democratized.

This, of course, has been the substance of a great deal of bickering that as gone on since the end of the war over conditions in the countries which ie between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the parliamentary ountries of Western Europe on the other. Which should come first ? Which is chicken and which egg—economic democracy or parliamentary nstitutions resting on a democratic franchise ? Mr. Bevin answers

one way and Mr. Molotov the other, and there seems to be no resolving their difference of view.

Then comes the second issue. If the class is the real unit of politico-economic power, and needs to act unitedly as a class, there can in logic be only one party expressing its point of view. There may indeed be a peasant party closely allied with a workers' party, though even this is felt to be a sign of political immaturity, because the workers and peasants should constitute a single, though complex, class group. There can be no room, except as a sheer concession to tactical necessities, for two socialist or workers' parties, expressing different policies and attitudes. Hence the insistence in the Russian zone of Germany on a unified socialist party swallowing up the social democrats ; and hence the ideological warfare against the socialist parties, even against those which collaborate with the communist parties, all over Europe. The existence of such parties constitutes a denial of the doctrine of ' democratic centralism ' and of the dogma of the ultimate reality of the class as against the individual citizen.

How far is what I have described as the British view shared by those in other West European countries who regard themselves as democrats ? By no means wholly ; for in the first place Communism, and the Marxism out of which it has come, are very much more powerful forces in the continental areas of Western Europe than they are in Great Britain, and secondly West European social democracy, as well as Communism, rests, at any rate in theory, largely on Marxian foundations, above all in Germany and in Austria, but also in part in the Latin countries, where the Marxian influence mingles with that of the libertarian doctrines of syndicalism and anarchism. These latter, equally with Marxism, insist on the notion of ' class-war ' as fundamental, but are hostile to the conception of ' democratic centralism ' which communists derive from it, while in the case of the social democrats Marxian doctrines have become more or less diluted by the exigencies of parliamentary practice and by the need of parties which have sought to attract a large body of electors under conditions offering no prospect of immediate revolutionary action to adapt their programmes to appeal to the doubtful voters and especially to the middle groups. European social democracy, in both France and Germany, often offered, up to the advent of Fascism, the spectacle of revolutionary slogans combined with reformist policies and with an acceptance of the conditions of parliamentary practice wherever the parliamentary system was so established as to give large scope for work along constitutional lines. Yet, at any rate in Germany, parliamentary government never came to exist as a living tradition in the minds of the people—including the working classes—in anything like the sense in which it had come to do so in Great Britain ; and even in France there existed side by side with a parliamentary tradition a sense in the background of revolution as a means of resolving conflicts which could not be settled by parliamentary

ve and take. The French never came to regard it as a matter of course at their internal conflicts must somehow admit of solution within the rliamentary framework. They continued to take their parliamentarism :th a pinch of revolutionary salt.

It must be admitted, I think, that only in a few Western countries art from Great Britain—and these small—is there a tradition of what has en called ' government by consent ', such as most British people have r a long time past taken almost for granted. There is, nevertheless, a rliamentary habit which has become fairly well rooted ; and there has isted, side by side with this, a considerable, though by no means entire, ceptance of the notion of tolerated difference and multi-party organiza- on as necessary elements both in the working of democracy and in the ruggle to widen its scope and deepen its practical meaning. The sis of Western Socialism, as well as of Western liberal thought in urope, had become, in the days before the Nazi conquest, largely dividualistic, in the sense of appealing to the individual and recognizing e value of individual and group activity as contributions to the making democracy. In practice the basis of continental social democracy was ot very different from that of British Labour, though the slogans and the tellectual framework of policy were different. But to-day, whereas ere has been practically no change in these respects in the political titude of the British people, except a move to the left within the frame- ork of the old assumptions, over most of the western part of the ontinent experience of fascist domination, either native, as in Germany nd Italy, or imposed from outside, as in France and Belgium and Holland nd Denmark and Norway, has shaken the foundations of the old social emocracy, created powerful communist movements and, at any rate in rance, made the socialists definitely a minority working-class party. et, even in France and in Western Germany, there is no sign that the ommunists are likely in the near future to become strong enough to le, and the principal effect of their strength is to consolidate the scattered rces which are against them into right, middle and moderate left party roupings which, if they agree in little else, are united in hostility to the ommunist philosophy as submerging the individual in the mass.

For the purposes of this article, I need not consider the groups of the ght, which are either openly, or if not openly yet obviously, hostile to nything that can rationally be called democracy. What concerns us here whether there is strength enough in the middle and moderate left roups, which broadly speaking take much the same view as the British ft, to create a coherent West European grouping standing for a West uropean democratic way of life that is neither communist nor capitalist, ut in a very broad sense ' parliamentary socialist ' as the British Labour arty is, and as a sufficient section of the British electorate to form a basis r a like-minded government showed itself in 1945. I realize, of course, at the British electoral system and the strength of the two-party tradition

in British politics played a very large part in giving Great Britain a powerful parliamentary socialist government, and that the many-party traditions and the electoral systems of most West European countries make it impossible for things to go quite the same way—and would do so, even if there were no strong West European communist parties to be reckoned with. I believe, however, that there are strong forces throughout Western Europe that stand for a way of life largely resembling the British way, and sharply different both from the Russian way on the one hand and from the American on the other; and, despite the difficulties under which these forces are labouring and the obvious obstacles in the way of uniting them under any common leadership, I have not given up hope of the situation so developing, given the right lead from Great Britain, as to restore to these forces the initiative which for the time being they have admittedly lost.

What about the Americans in relation to all this? They and Mr. Bevin seem to agree pretty well about the order which is to be observed in establishing democracy in the disputed areas of Europe; but, in reality, I think their views are more different than their conclusions. Mr. Bevin wants parliamentary institutions in the belief that they will lead in due course towards economic democracy, and towards that social democracy which is intimately related to it in his mind. Many Americans, on the other hand, want democratic political institutions largely as a means of, and in forms suitable for, preventing the very social and economic consequences which Mr. Bevin desires. They want a kind of political democracy which, like that of the United States, will work within a very limited field of government and will leave full scope to private enterprise in the economic field. With this they would like to see the same sort of non-political, non-economic 'social' democracy (not, of course, Social Democracy in the party sense) which they believe to exist in the United States. They, fully as much as Mr. Bevin—if not even more—put the achievement of political democracy in the forefront and cherish the belief that it is possible to implant parliamentary institutions upon countries that have no real parliamentary traditions. They expect such institutions to work pretty much in the same way as they work in the countries which do possess a long standing tradition of parliamentary government and have either started, as the United States did, on a foundation of political democracy, or struggled, as Western Europe has, to make their political institutions more democratic over a long period of constitutional evolution. This, again, seems to the Soviet leaders to be sheer nonsense. They hold that parliamentary institutions thus superimposed on undemocratic economic foundations, so far from working democratically, will positively obstruct the development of democracy, because they will lead to a paralysis of governmental action which will leave the undemocratic economic and social institutions intact.

There is, of course, another aspect of the difference, which I have

ırposely left aside until now. As we have seen, the parliamentary ɔnception of democracy, as it has developed in Western Europe, and to a uch smaller extent as it has developed in the United States, includes as ıe of its essential elements a substantial degree of tolerance of conflicting ɔinions. It is always taken for granted under the parliamentary systems hich have grown up in the West that the Opposition (or the Oppositions there be more than one) is entitled to a respect and consideration because is destined to be the government of to-morrow, or, at the least, to take ırt in the making of the government of to-morrow or the day after. he existence of an Opposition free to speak its own mind and to be ɔntinually appealing to the electorate against the government is accepted Western thought as an integral part of the system of parliamentary :mocracy. There are, indeed, substantial differences from country to ɔuntry. We in Great Britain have, like the Americans, a strong preference r a two-party system, which allows of regular alternations of government :tween two parties, each in its turn commanding majority support ; hereas a number of other countries, following the theory that representa- ɔn should mirror the many-minded electorate, resort to such electoral ethods as proportional representation, which yield a multiplicity of .rties and usually make it impossible for any one party to secure a majority its own.

This is not the place to argue the merits of these variants upon the rliamentary theme. I have a strong preference for the two-party stem, on the ground that it is essential, at any rate in times of stress, for country to have a coherent government that knows its own mind and is a position to act on its convictions. But what is more relevant here is at the entire conception of tolerated difference—of difference even elcomed because it eases the transition from one party's government to other's—is alien to the basic conception of Soviet democracy. Accord- g to Marxist theory each class embodies its own conception of class thority and social structure—including, of course, the structure of ɔlitical institutions. By those who take this view, an Opposition may be lerated for tactical reasons but cannot be respected—much less welcomed as a necessary element in the interplay of social forces. Oppositions ust be either assimilated or liquidated : they must either be induced to ɔrk in subordination to the party which stands for the conceptions of the ɔminant class, or they must be swept aside, or at the very least intimidated to acquiescence. There is no room in the Marxist philosophy for ything even remotely resembling the parliamentary system as we are customed to operate it in Great Britain, or even as it is operated in the nited States or in France.

The difference between the Eastern and Western conception of mocracy thus turns out to be two-fold, and to be, on the one hand, a spute about the primacy of political or of economic factors and, on e other, a dispute about the desirability of giving real recognition to

conflicting views. Now, in this controversy, I find myself agreeing in the main with the Marxists on the one issue and with the parliamentarians on the other. I agree with the communists that it is fantastic to suppose that parliamentary institutions will work democratically if they are set up suddenly in a country which has no parliamentary tradition behind it and has undergone no economic social revolution such as to transform the basis of class relationships. I agree with the Soviet view that, if we want democracy in the areas in Europe in which there is no democratic tradition, or at any rate none of sufficient strength, we must begin by helping the inhabitants to carry through a social revolution that will transform the basis of property relations, and that only when this has been done can we expect political institutions to operate in a democratic way. But, as against this, I profoundly disagree with the Soviet view that it is necessary to base the political institutions of the new democratic era upon the principle of class solidarity carried to the point of regarding all opposition as counter-revolutionary. Even if this view has something to be said for it in certain parts of Eastern Europe, that is the case only because the foundations of the social revolution are not yet in those areas sufficiently assured to enable the institutions of political democracy to work on a basis of recognized party conflict ; and I am sure that the attempt to apply the Soviet notion of ' democratic centralism ' in the countries of the West, where the rival tradition is powerfully entrenched in men's minds, simply will not work at all and will result in the kind of paralysis of social forces that is now threatening to overtake France.

Part of the trouble, of course, is that countries cannot be neatly classified as falling into two groups, to one of which we can apply without qualification the adjective ' Western ' and to the other not. Down the centre of Europe runs a group of countries which lie culturally and by political and social tradition between the two. Among these are not only Czechoslovakia and Austria in Central Europe but also undoubtedly Italy ; and I think that in the evolution of European affairs during the years that lie ahead these countries that lie midway between the rival ideologies will occupy a position of the very greatest importance. I believe it is sheer folly for Mr. Bevin to join hands with the Americans in endeavouring to impose Western conceptions of parliamentary government, whether on European or on American models, upon Yugoslavia or Rumania, because the necessary foundations for such parliamentary systems simply do not exist in these relatively primitive countries. But Czechoslovakia and Italy and Austria are another matter, for they belong to the West fully as much as to the East, and if it would be folly for Westerners to endeavour to impose Western conceptions on the Balkans it is surely no less absurd for the Soviet Union to attempt to impose its own conceptions upon countries which have strong cultural affinities with the Western group.

I take it that all sensible people, whatever their social philosophies may

(leaving out, that is, philosophies that are not tenable by sensible people), want to prevent not only a war which will inevitably be disastrous for Western Europe and perhaps totally destructive of Western European civilization but also, even short of war, the permanent existence of an 'iron curtain' between East and West. Sensible people want to find a way in which countries dominated by different social ideologies can live together without either violent conflict or sharp isolation from each other. I believed, from the moment when war broke out, that at its end there would be for a time some sort of 'iron curtain' across Europe, for I saw no way of avoiding this. What I always hoped was that this curtain would be temporary and that the very different civilizations of East and West would find means not merely of living side by side without conflict but of engaging in fruitful and friendly intercourse despite their differences of outlook. I still hope this, evil as the omens seem; and, hoping it, I want more than anything else to see Western Europe draw together in some sort of closer union for the preservation of its own way of life. I want such a union, not at all as part of an anti-communist crusade directed from America—nothing could be more abhorrent to me than such a crusade, or more certain to bring sheer destruction upon Western Europe. What I want is a mediation between the American and the Soviet power blocs, in the shape of a grouping not hostile to the East, but set upon averting the danger that the division of the whole world into two rival camps may result, after a period of perilous isolation, in a third world war much more annihilating than either of its predecessors. I want Western Europe to draw together, not for the purpose of aiding America against the Soviet Union, but for the purpose of interposing itself between the Americans and the Soviet Union and endeavouring to mediate between the extreme views which they severally represent. And, just as I want Western Europe to mediate between the United States and the Soviet Union, so, on a smaller scale, I want Czechoslovakia and Austria and Italy to be in a position to mediate between Western and Eastern Europe, developing institutions which have something in them of the Western and something also of the Eastern world. How this can be brought about I do not profess to know with any clarity, for no one can foresee, even for a little ahead, the course of development of European affairs; but for those of us who believe that there is in Western culture something worth keeping and something which can, if it is not destroyed by war, yield fine democratic fruits, there is I think no alternative but to keep on working for greater unity between the countries which share in the common traditions of the West, and, while we are doing this, carefully to refrain from allying ourselves ideologically with either the Soviet Union or the United States. For, if we allow ourselves to be absorbed into the system of either of these giants, sheer destruction lies ahead, both for our children and for the values which our civilization, however imperfectly, enshrines.

THE TWO CAMPS

I. Contemporary Conservatism

THE relationship between political theory and practical politics is at all times difficult to assess and almost impossible to define. Action if it be intelligent, must have its mainsprings in thought, and thought, if it is not to be sterile, must ultimately express itself in action, but external events and human thoughts do not always march in step. A man who first rationalizes the differences between two parties to a great historical conflict, such as the Reformation, the English Civil War, or the French Revolution, and then proceeds to explain the actions of those parties in the light of his own analysis, will produce what will seem, to a student who knows what men did and what sorts of men they were who did it, a jejune and somewhat curious, if possibly stimulating version of history. The publicist who, in seeking to explain and to justify the actions of his own political party in the light of a theory of politics, first seeks to differentiate his own basic theory from that of his opponents, and then on that basis to define what will be his own course of action, will be in danger of dealing with unrealities or, at least, of tilting at windmills. A more fruitful, certainly a safer, method of approach would be first to analyse the main political controversies of recent times and the rôle that the several political parties have played in them, and then, on the foundations of fact so laid, to evaluate the different doctrines that inspired them. It is the former, the less sound method that Mr. Quintin Hogg has adopted in his intensely interesting book.*

It is perhaps inevitable that one who was formerly an undistinguished student of history should make this criticism of a book written by an extremely able student of philosophy. But the public has the right to expect of a critic either impartiality, or at least frankness in partiality ; and many differences divide Mr. Hogg and myself besides the fact that the intellectual disciplines that we underwent in our youth were not the same. I first met Mr. Hogg in March, 1930 ; in April 1930 I joined the Labour Party.

Although it would be an exaggeration to say that this sequence was a matter of cause and effect, and I respect Mr. Hogg both as a politician and as a man, it would be less than honest not to confess that I am not likely to be particularly susceptible to the various arguments that in this book he

**The Case for Conservatism.* By Quintin Hogg. Double Penguin. 2s.

rings forward.

These arguments are directed to three main ends : first, to establishing ositively the case for Conservatism ; secondly, to destroying the ase for all other political creeds and, more particularly, hat Mr. Hogg conceives to be the Socialist doctrines of the British abour Party ; thirdly, to criticizing the policy and actions of the present abour Government.

For the first of these purposes he relies on a series of broad, general ropositions which are, in themselves, quite unexceptionable. He peaks of the conflict between liberty and authority and offers the rule of w as the Conservative solution : " . . . just as Conservatives believe iat the freedom of the individual is subject to law, so also subject to iat rule must be the power of the State and the discretion of Ministers o fetter the freedom of the individual." The sentiment is admirable, and seems rather shrewish to point out that it was a Socialist, Lord Haldane, ho was the first Lord Chancellor to address himself seriously to the roblem of the privileged position of the Crown before the law by appoint- ig a Committee to draft a Crown Proceedings Bill, that it was iother Socialist Lord Chancellor, Lord Jowitt, who introduced the rown Proceedings Bill, and that it was a Socialist-dominated House of ommons—admittedly with some help from Conservatives, including Ir. Hogg himself—that passed it into law. It is at least arguable that ie rule of law is not a Conservative monopoly, though Mr. Hogg allows imself the luxury of some rather vague suggestions that the rule of law o which he refers is not the law of the land, but some natural or moral .w that is incapable of further definition beyond that any action of which Ir. Hogg strongly disapproves is a breach of it. He is, however, too ood a lawyer to carry this doctrine to the lengths that some of his olleagues did in the debates on the Parliament Bill.

Another example of an irreproachable doctrine acclaimed as a speci- cally Conservative article of faith is that " Conservatives do not believe iat political struggle is the most important thing in life." The question , who does ? The claim that in this respect Conservatives " differ from ommunists, Socialists, Nazis, Fascists, Social Creditors and most iembers of the British Labour Party " is simply without foundation. oliticians, like other men, are sometimes prone to exaggerate the impor- ince of their own activities, but it is probable that Conservative politicians ave quite a fair share of this amiable eccentricity.

Again, according to Mr. Hogg : " Conservatives do not believe that the hole art and science of government can be summed up in some convenient hrase or catchword like ' Socialism ' any more than the whole art of iedicine is contained in an advertising slogan like ' night starvation' ." he implication is clear, that those who are not Conservatives do enter- ain such a belief ; but really it is for Mr. Hogg to prove his case and not o rely on a series of innuendoes to establish it.

The point that Mr. Hogg so frequently makes, that Conservative doctrine cannot be reduced to a single formula, is a perfectly fair one. The same could be said, with truth, of Christianity, or for that matter of Socialism ; but it does not follow that it would be improper to attempt to formulate a series of propositions, like the Nicene Creed, that go to the root of the matter, and the main disappointment for the reader of this book is that Mr. Hogg fails to do so. There are at least four places, in addition to the passages quoted above, where the author seems to be nearing the heart of his subject. He contrasts equality of opportunity with equality of achievement, and states his belief in the former. He states that Conservatives " do not refuse recognition to the pioneer, or all reward to the business executive or inventor." In a fine chapter on agriculture he defines the continuous improvement of the legacies of the past as being characteristic of the Conservative approach to politics. And in another passage he asserts that " . . . economic democracy, economic freedom means the sharing, the diffusion, of economic power, that is, property, as widely as possible throughout the community. This diffusion Conservatives regard as the very antithesis of Socialism."

On the last of these points it can only be said, once again, that Mr. Hogg's antithesis is false : there are some Socialists who would say that a period of State dictatorship is necessary in order to destroy a capitalist dictatorship, and others who would say that where the effective choice was between public monopoly and private monopoly the former was to be preferred. It is not the diffusion of property that the Socialist opposes but such strong concentrations of it in private hands as give its owners control over other people's lives. Of the other three points, though there is much effective rhetoric, there is no demonstration that the beliefs and characteristics that Mr. Hogg mentions are specifically Conservative. In short, Mr. Hogg fails to be wholly effectual in his statement of the positive case for Conservatism because unless the reader makes all the same assumptions he will not reach the same conclusions, and the author does not develop the argument that his assumptions are correct.

The same line of criticism must be applied to Mr. Hogg's attempt to destroy the case for other political creeds. He too often tries to make his opponent look ridiculous by attributing to him—sometimes, it is true on the grounds of an unguarded utterance—belief in an obvious fallacy, such as that controls are a means of increasing wealth rather than, what they obviously are, means of diverting materials in short supply into the channels where they are most needed. When he states that planning is inconsistent with democracy, he is guilty, first, of confusing democracy with liberty—a fallacy from which his classical erudition should have protected him—and secondly, of insufficiently examining the question whether it is possible to retain a large measure of individual initiative within the framework of a broad economic plan. It is wrong to take the whole of Professor Hayek's arguments as being proved. Perhaps the

weakest chapter in the book is on "The Socialist Heresy", which combines a diatribe against Communism with a tilt against the Roman Church; neither of which, perhaps, has an obvious relevance to modern Social Democracy.

Mr. Hogg cannot make up his mind whether Socialist or Liberal beliefs are heresies that impair the health of the body politic or whether they are merely statements of part of the truth, not to be accepted as complete although he recognizes that in this imperfect world truth often emerges only by means of a conflict that leads to a synthesis. He often displays profound intolerance and he actually refers to the " Socialist heresy " and the " Liberal heresy ", but many passages occur in his book from which he emerges as a convinced and discerning democrat.

Finally, it is in dealing with the policy and actions of the present Government that he is at his most controversial although he is at pains to limit the area of dispute by saying that the only important difference between the parties at the General Election of 1945 was nationalization. In this analysis he shows himself surprisingly ignorant of the true nature of political controversy, for the real issue that generally divides the moderates, at least, on either side is not the aims to which they would subscribe as being desirable so much as the sacrifices they are prepared to make in order to achieve them. The main case against the Conservative Party between the wars is that it failed to make the necessary sacrifices for attaining ends now generally agreed to be desirable. Those who voted for the Labour Party at the General Election did not do so as much because they hoped that Utopia could arise out of Armageddon as because they doubted whether the Conservative Party, in view of its record between the wars, was a likely instrument to achieve that more equal distribution of income which Mr. Hogg, by implication, at least, admits is to be wished; or was likely to have the will to carry through the programme of reconstruction to which its leaders in the National Government were committed.

The chapter on nationalization is one of the very few chapters that could be dismissed as mere platform clap-trap. It embodies the stupid fallacy that because different arguments are used for nationalizing different industries they must all be wrong. Generally, Mr. Hogg is at his worst in dealing with economics; there is one delightfully naïve passage in which he complains with heartfelt bitterness that the Government decided to continue State trading in cotton but elected to restore the rubber market without explaining why—the reason of course being that the Opposition did not challenge or even question the latter decision. So much for Mr. Hogg's plea that individual industries should be considered on their merits!

This is a book of singularly uneven quality. Its writer is one of the most gifted men of our generation, and he was brought up and has spent his life in the great world of high politics. Mr. Hogg is sincere, and is capable of considerable objectivity. On the other hand he gives the

impression of never having given the fundamentals of politics as much attention as he has the fundamentals of philosophy. He has yet to learn that the whole truth about a complex political problem cannot be expressed in a single syllogism however neat, and he is altogether too disposed to chop schoolboy logic. His anxiety to press home a political point sometimes leads him to elementary errors even in matters of law, as in his remarks on the position of doctors under the National Health Service Bill.* And he sometimes shows an irritating sense of superiority where an opponent has made a point ineptly or in bad English, whereas his own by no means flawless English might well benefit from study of Fowler's *English Usage*. None the less, while he pleases to flaunt his weaknesses, his virtues are deeper and harder to find. Many passages in the book show real wisdom and insight, and he will have to be either a very wise or a very foolish man not to learn from them. Mr. Hogg, like Mr. Gladstone was, is one of the great examinees of his time; and the examiners will have to concede, with whatever reluctance and with certain qualifications, that he has added yet another to his many distinctions.

W. T. Wells.

II. Contemporary Socialism

I AM disappointed in Mr. Parker's book†. This could mean that I as a political opponent am disappointed to find how strong a case Mr. Parker can put ; but it does not. I am disappointed, not because Mr. Parker has put this case so well nor even because he has put it so badly, but because he has not really put it at all.

According to the publisher's note, Mr. Parker was to write " a book expounding the faith of the Labour Party." " Expounding " is a dreary sub-academic word ; but " faith " is a fine word, suggesting fire in the belly and ice on the head. It was with faith that this book should have been concerned ; and a most interesting book it could have been. What is the essence of the Socialist faith, to which the British Labour Party officially subscribe ? How far is belief in its attainment modified by the experience of Parliamentary Socialism in practice ? What is the position of the Parliamentary Socialist, if Socialism cannot be attained by Parliamentary means ? What are the chances of Socialism stopping short of totalitarianism ? Can Parliamentary Socialism hope to survive as a system, or must it be a half-way house to Communism, just as history views the Girondins and Kerensky as milestones on the descent to despotism ? Will Parliamentary Socialism be defeated economically by

*Courts of law of course do not adjudicate on the competence of professional men as such. They have to deal with a question of wrongful dismissal, an act of negligence or misconduct, or defamation—where the central issue is quite different.

†*Labour Marches On.* By John Parker. Penguin. 1s.

s failure to solve the problem of incentive, abandoning the carrot and aring to grasp the stick ? Can Socialism in any event work without the ompulsive power of the State ? Do Socialists think that any mess of ottage can be a good enough substitute for the birthright of liberty ; and so, what is the standard to be applied ?

These are contemporary questions. They, and many others like them, re in men's minds to-day. There is room for a book, and by a British ocialist, addressing itself to these great questions. I had rather expected hat this was to be such a book ; and I had looked forward to weighing he value of the answers in non-Socialist scales. I am deprived of this leasurable intellectual exercise by the perversity of Mr. Parker. Whether ecause he has misunderstood what I feel must have been intended to be is terms of reference or because of an invincible repugnance in his own emperament, he has shrunk from the task. Mr. Parker has avoided the igh and difficult ground of thought. He has preferred to escort his eaders through backyard plots, well enough laid out in their way, no oubt, and thickly planted with familiar little facts.

Now I want to be quite fair to Mr. Parker and propose to give him the enefit of putting last things first. This is because it is not till the seven- enth chapter, entitled " Last But Not Least ", that the despairing eader arrives at any attempt to discuss major questions. This chapter pens with the promising words : " Where are we travelling ? What ind of society will exist in the Socialist Britain the Labour Party is seeking o create ? Is the individual man and woman to be completely submerged n the mass ? These are some of the questions which the public are asking hemselves."

What follows ? " The answer given in the Tory Press ", says Mr. arker, " is clear ". But why start with the Tory Press ? Why, when ou have allowed yourself only ten pages for discussing these great uestions, devote the first of them to the views of the Tory Press and the ext to your own repudiation of these views ? Nor is Mr. Parker's ontroversy with the Tory Press carried on at a very high level. It entres on the threadbare theme of whether there will be too many Civil ervants under Socialism. This is, if you like, an important question. ut it is not *the* important question. What is much more important is the ffect upon the Socialist faith (and upon the traditional interpretation of he conflict within capitalism which is said to be both the opportunity and he justification of Socialism) of what Mr. James Burnham has called the Managerial Revolution. If Mr. Burnham's thesis is right, traditional ocialism and traditional capitalism are both out of date, because power as really passed—or is in process of passing—to " the salaried executives nd engineers and managers and accountants and bureaucrats and the est, who do not fit without distortion into either the ' capitalist ' or worker ' category.* But there is no evidence that Mr. Parker has

*James Burnham : *The Managerial Revolution*, p.48.

reconsidered the case for Socialism in the light of Mr. Burnham's analysis ; and there is certainly no mention of Mr. Burnham or his work in *Labour Marches On.*

Mr. Burnham states his theory of the managerial revolution quite objectively. He is not primarily concerned with whether or not it is a desirable development ; he is content to show that it has happened, or is happening. But people concerned with politics must go further than that. They must first of all consider whether they agree with Mr. Burnham's analysis. If they accept it, they must go on to ask themselves how far it is inevitable, and how far it is desirable : if they come to the conclusion that it is not wholly inevitable nor wholly desirable, they must consider how best it can be modified and adapted in order to keep political democracy alive and to advance towards social and economic democracy. Obviously, therefore, there is much need for new thinking among Socialists and non-Socialists alike. But Mr. Parker contracts out of the necessity. He is prepared to ignore the managerial revolution, and the limitations which it imposes on old-time Socialist and capitalist theorizing. He prefers, in a word, to go on playing nineteenth century political ping-pong—even when there is nobody on the other side of the net.

After this false start, Mr. Parker goes on to discuss the important question of equality. " Socialists ", he proclaims, " believe strongly in two different kinds of equality. In the first place they believe in equality of opportunity." This seems promising, until a few lines later we are told " obviously absolute equality of opportunity can never by attained."

What can then be attai ned ? Equality of income perhaps ? But no. " Bernard Shaw has argued strongly in favour of such a policy, but has won very few converts either here or in Russia . . . The majority of British Socialists would stoutly oppose equality of income and would favour giving extra monetary rewards to those holding the more responsible posts." This, of course, is true. But the interesting thing is : why is it true ? The reason presumably is that Mr. Shaw, arguing for academic Socialism—from, if you like, an insufficiently practical standpoint—considers equality of income to be essential, if Socialism is to mean more than mere economic centralization. The Russians, on the other hand, have accepted the principle of managerial society ; and it is implicit in Mr. Parker's words—and confirmed indeed from a mass of other evidence —that the British Socialists have in the main accepted the same principle. But Mr. Parker does not recognize this explicitly and so has nothing to contribute to the interesting question of whether the new " managerial " Socialism would be recognized as such either by Robert Owen or Karl Marx.

But, continues Mr. Parker triumphantly, though we cannot have either equality of opportunity or equality of income we can at least have equality of status. What does it involve, this equality of status ? It means that " every man and woman should have equal rights and duties as a citizen

take part in the affairs of the nation and that certain basic necessities ould be provided for all." This is excellent, but it is certainly not culiar to Socialism. Not only would Conservatives say the same : it is fact precisely what Mr. Churchill said, in perhaps more resonant terms, the Brighton Conference of the Conservative Party. The interesting int about all this is not so much what British Socialists say about it, as at they can do about it. The provision of basic necessities in con- mporary Britain has got to be achieved out of production. It follows at the condition of maximum security for all is maximum production m all ; and maximum production from all depends not only on good onomic organization but on maximum personal effort. This in turn ings us back to the great problem of incentive under parliamentary cialism ; but this is one of the major problems, which Mr. Parker has ssed by.

Then there is the great question of the reconciliation of freedom and mocracy with Socialism. Here is a theme for a book such as this. Mr. rker gives it about two and a half pages. He says that interference by e State with the freedom of the few is necessary to increase the freedom the many. But he does not meet the argument that in practice what nds to happen is that the freedom of the many is taken away to increase e privilege of the few—not the old feudal few, but the new managerial w. This is the gist of the social case against the new managerial system, d against British Socialism which is in the main an application of that stem. But Mr. Parker ignores it. Central boards of " managers " ve been set up to administer State monopolies, and not far in reserve lie e dread powers of direction of labour to help them do so. Is this stem compatible with freedom and democracy, or is it not ? Some bold d realistic Socialists might argue that economic necessity dictates this stem, and that arguments about abstractions like freedom and democracy e irrelevant. Not so Mr. Parker : he prefers to vary Burke's advice d to ignore where he cannot presently comprehend. It is true that he produces the commonplaces of Socialist party hustings, and claims that ear of unemployment is the real great restriction on individual freedom. is certainly a fact that adverse economic circumstances, and particularly nemployment may inhibit personal freedom. But it does not follow om that—as Mr. Parker's logic would appear to suggest—that to be mployed is to be free.

Mr. Parker says that " Socialists hold the view that political democracy f the kind existing under liberal capitalism will naturally develop into cial democracy. . . ." This must be a comforting belief, but there is ngularly little in Mr. Parker's book to show what it is based on. Why ould a system of centralized administration of State monopolies preserve olitical democracy, let alone achieve social democracy ? I am sure that Marx and Engels, with their vision of the State " withering away " would ave roundly condemned such a heterodox assumption. The truth is, of

course, that there have been two main, and conflicting, interpretations of Socialism—*étatisme* and syndicalism. The advocates of the former maintain, with perfect truth, that the latter is not practical : the advocates of the latter maintain, with equal truth, that the former is not democratic, and, from the point of view of the workers, does not represent an advance from capitalism. The Labour Government have chosen *étatisme*, and in doing so have, of course, the approval of Fabian Mr. Parker. But equally, in doing so, they lay themselves open to the charge that this is not Socialism in the syndicalist sense : that is to say, we are as far off as ever from workers' control of industry. Indeed there is good ground for supposing that the approach to industry of British Socialism makes the worst of both worlds.

With the rest of Mr. Parker's book I have very little quarrel. He tells us the familiar story of the growth of the Labour Party, and the less familiar—but, equally, less attractive—story of its present machinery. He tells us how the nation was ready for a change in 1945, and how fortunate it was for the Government that they inherited a lot of useful wartime controls, which they might not have been able to impose in time of peace. He talks of the inter-war years with the familiar anti-Tory bias of the Left and even classes the period of the second Baldwin Government (1924-29) as one of missed opportunities in the international field, which seems rather an ungrateful epitaph on the work of Sir Austen Chamberlain. And on page 42 he makes a major howler by confusing " contracting-in " with " contracting-out ". But the main criticism of this part of his book is that it will interest only those interested in the mechanics and composition of the Labour Party : for those interested in contemporary political thought and development, it is a Barmecide feast.

Mr. Parker has in fact perpetrated a period piece. But it lacks the charm often found in such compositions, because it is not meant to be a period piece. It is simply that Mr. Parker, probably without knowing it, is bogged down in the past. He is the Fabian who delayed too long. The stream of contemporary thought has passed on, leaving him monotonously chanting the commonplaces of yesterday. He belongs to the " gas and water" school of Socialism : but his treatment of it in this book is deflated and dehydrated. If he will look at the fourteenth chapter of Professor Alexander Gray's book *The Socialist Tradition*—which strangely enough, by the way, does not figure in his bibliography—he will see that " the Fabians were largely instrumental in enabling English Socialism to by-pass Marx." Events have taken their revenge on this twentieth century Fabian, who in turn appears to have been by-passed by most of what is significant in political thought and development in the world to-day.

DEREK WALKER-SMITH.

TELEPATHY, RADIATION AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

By Joshua C. Gregory

A BOTTLE can be smashed off a wall by a stone, or poked off by a stick, or squirted off by a jet of water, or torn off by a lasso. This mechanical consequence of kinetically efficacious contact seems be immediately intelligible. The Humes can denounce this sense immediate intelligibility, but they cannot destroy it. The flying stone d the squirting jet represent the chief analogy of science and its main pository method—the emanation. The emanative efficacy acts by ojection, as in the water thrown from the jet, or by transmitting an pulse through a medium, like sound through air. The electromagnetic ve, for instance, and the bombarding neutron are highly reconstructed rsions of the original analogues. In this dynamic world separated ngs do interact—the iron flies to the magnet or the sun melts away the ow. Nature uses the emanation freely enough to give significant es ; science uses these clues freely enough to make emanative inter- ion her chief expository method.

Whitehead notes " the predominant importance of wave-transmission physical nature." It is important when Nature uses emanative inter- tion between human beings to let them communicate by sense-percep- n. This is clearest and most undeniable in sound and hearing. The can be pumped out of a bottle, then back into it, or resistantly squeezed o a cylinder, and its vibratory pulses can be detected. The air un- stakably carries sound from a quivering bell or speaking mouth to the r. The emanative in visual perception is less clearly identified, for the edium puzzles, and the radiation is construed mathematically more easily an it is conceived physically.

When Jack and Jill talk together they interact emanatively and thus mmunicate through sense-perception. If Jack sees on his breakfast le a letter addressed in familiar handwriting he may see Jill in imagina- n or even hear her speak. If he sits in the dark he can still see and hear r in imagination. The actual interview plainly uses present sense- rception ; past sense-perception makes the memory interview possible.

If Jack sees Jill in distress, and hears her cries, two hundred miles away, ither apparent sense-perception nor memory can inform him. If Jill tually is in distress, and does cry out, Jack seems to know about Jill in an usual way. He may have a special clairvoyant insight, or Jill may mmunicate with him by an abnormal method. Such communication,

or apparent communication, outside ordinary sense-perception is commonly called telepathy.

Real or apparent telepathic transmission, spontaneously produced or experimentally obtained, varies widely. A transmitter in Prague, for example, and a receiver in London sit down at an arranged time with pencil and paper. The transmitter draws a trident ; the receiver draws a wine-cup which is very like a trident with rounded shoulders and without the middle prong. The receiver often responds by reasonably recognizable copies. A mass of very varied data, represented by the supposititious Jack—Jill episode and the experimental " visual transmission ", has convinced many that telepathy is a fact, and many others that it very probably is.

Facts are " chiels that winna ding ", but presumed facts may have to be dinged. Æ would see no reason to try to ding the facts of telepathy. Some figures of his imagination, he writes in *The Candle of Vision*, walk " with authentic motions and undistorted anatomies " : some of his visual images have all the perceptual reality of soldiers parading in review. Such self-authenticated images may well be genuine visitors. Memory-pictures, he admits, may be two-dimensional, but other pictures mingle with them, and some come from the minds of others. If all mental images, Yeats suggests, are forms in the Anima Mundi, the general vehicle, and mirrored in each particular human vehicle " many crooked things are made straight." This fervent poetic notion might straighten out the apparently crooked facts of telepathy, but to cooler science they seem to be crooked still. Telepathy seems to be a fact, and ought not to be ; this fairly represents a very general attitude.

Coleridge believed that thought would have been more perfect, and better manifested, without any communication by language. He compares his fancy to another by Rogers : that the next world has no speech or language, but thoughts stream from mind to mind. If this were so on earth then perpetual babel would have its seat on this distracted globe, for it would be as if every one else in the world talked at once to any one bewildered man. If the natural intercourse between minds is telepathic, as when Frederick Myers suggests an analogy between telepathy in the mental domain and gravitation in the physical, it risks this babel. On this view sense-perception checks, or helps to check, the distracting telepathic messages, so that only some get through.

If telepathy represents a rudimentary sense, still imperfectly developed, as Earl Balfour suggests, it may be difficult to deal with. This also suggests the first, natural, almost inevitable speculative approach. Balfour suggests this approach in 1894—a sense adapted to the longer wave-lengths, he says, suits present science.

Speculation ought first to try radiation—the emanative emission which is the principal expository method of science. As the visual emanations differ from the auditory, the telepathic emanations may differ from both.

Modern science has discovered, or conceived, too many forms of radiation, such as the cosmic rays, for the attempt to be refused or readily abandoned. Whether radio waves, for instance, or neutron streams for another, are real or only hypothetical, the radiation concept is available enough and indispensable enough to modern science to be applied to telepathy in the first speculative effort to make it intelligible.

Determined speculation makes science acquainted with strange concepts. It does so in 1919 when the Rev. Professor G. Henslow heroically presumes thoughts to be corpuscles of electricity which stream from one mental centre to another. This expository expedient is an interesting impress of the current theory. Since Sir J. J. Thomson had called the unit of electricity a " corpuscle ", Henslow's flowing corpuscular thoughts are, in effect, streaming electrons. He recognizes another available concept for speculation in the sub-conscious : this also is a flow of electrically corpuscular thoughts. If there is telepathy at all, Bergson observes, it well may operate always and everywhere. Henslow's streaming corpuscular thoughts correspond to universal telepathy. If telepathy is universal, Bergson adds, it may interfere relatively seldom, either because it has little intensity, or because cerebral mechanisms stop it. Statistically, telepathy manifests selectiveness—some people, for instance, can receive " visual transmissions ", and others cannot. Henslow applies the obvious analogy of transmitting cells in one brain and receiving cells in another. This has an obvious companion analogy in selectiveness—any particular brain cells may or may not be adapted to receive from any other particular brain cells.

The ether has troubled physical science by its inability to carry electromagnetic waves because it is not there to carry them. A mental analogue of the discarded ether is a natural speculative resort. Aldous Huxley refers to this suggestion by Broad in 1936. In 1941 Erik Palmstierna conceives non-physical radiations in a " field of psychic events " to carry telepathic impressions.

Duffy still perseveres with the radiative emanation in 1944. He presumes active brain cells to produce weak radiation with wave-lengths comparable to the shortest radio waves. These emanations usually operate within their own originating brain, but occasional telepathy occurs when they do reach the brains of others. Duffy applies notions, such as the beam, to explain selective or localized reception, and the projection of the radiation to great distances. The last item seems to be the Achilles' heel of emanatively conceived telepathy. Distance seems to make no difference : if the agent can get at the percipient across a room he can get at him across two hundred miles or more of sea, plain and mountain. Precognition, the recognition of future events, seems to defy time, but one conundrum at a time is enough here. Speculation now turns hopefully from the emanation of physics to the psychological concept of the unconscious.

This is as fundamental in psychology as the emanation is in physics—perhaps more so. In 1920 Earl Balfour notes the apparent selective guidance in telepathy and how distance thins out radiation. Psychology may succeed at one point where physics fails : the distance which thins radiation out may not exist for the unconscious.

The literary writer may legitimately speak of Joyce's " venturesome journey into the dark of the subconscious ", but he may mislead. A smuggler's cave is directly accessible ; the unconscious is not—as Professor H. H. Price puts it, in psychological language, unconscious mental processes are not introspectible. Literary writers who exploit the maunderings of the unconscious actually describe its conscious consequences. This is probably understood, but it may be forgotten that the unconscious is *inferred* from conscious experiences. Things happen in the conscious mind *as if* it has an unconscious. A. I. Richards calls an " unconscious mind " a " fairly evident " though useful fiction. Memory is too inexplicable without the presumed unconscious for this statement to be welcome. The great diversified mass of biological data demands the concept of evolution. Like biological evolution the unconscious is a highly trusted postulate, and, like it again, is logically a hypothesis. As such it may be indispensable and yet fictitious—things may happen *as if*, and only as if, it exists. It is legitimate scientific method to use the unconscious on this understanding in speculating on telepathy.

The unconscious may be what Richards calls " goings on in the nervous system " ; this, he adds, is " readily accepted as a satisfactory substitute ". The simplest rendering of this reduces the unconscious to brain processes unaccompanied by consciousness, and the telepathic communication between unconscious minds to interaction between those brain processes. Speculation is then back again at radiation. To be a speculative alternative to radiation unconscious events must be mental, or, at any rate, not physiological. Price denies that they are physiological. He also glances at the third further speculative complication—a third realm which is neither physical nor mental.

Literary writers who exploit the maunderings of the unconscious emphasize its desultory haphazard habits. According to Whitcutt, Blake explored the strange region of the unconscious mind more thoroughly than any other man, and his poetry is " a kind of outline " of it. This identification of the unconscious with such special manifestations may be very misleading. Psycho-analytical psychology inclines to judge the unconscious by the extravagances of dream rather than by more sober waking consciousness, and, with Jung, to describe " unconscious manifestations " as mainly " chaotic and irrational." Some puzzles give the child twelve assorted pictures, and ask him to combine them into a story. One theory of dreaming assumes that the unconscious pitches up a handful of ideas and images for the conscious to do its best with. Disciplined continuous thinking would be impossible if the unconscious

simply such a set of vagaries. Its normal relations to the conscious ust be more smooth than this. In one place Jung admits that normally e unconscious does collaborate with the conscious too smoothly and nobtrusively for its existence to be suspected.

The perceptible " strange eventful history " has its equally eventful, rhaps still stranger, and invisible parallel in the organized and con- antly organizing unconscious. As babies in a row kick and wave, each cks or waves its kinaesthetic and tactual experiences into its unconscious organize it. Each unconscious is steadily organized as each baby kicks, aves, grasps, presses, feeds, tastes, smells, hears and sees. As this most incredibly complex organization integrates, the child steadily arns to recognize, to grasp truly instead of randomly, and to manifest a owing intelligence.

When the adult hears the word " tiger " he understands because the range eventful history of his unconscious began in his cradle to land m with his present mental outfit. The dictionary definition of " tiger " ns : ' a large Asiatic striped feline quadruped.' Each word in the finition represents its quota of experience organized round the nuclear ord " tiger " into the concept. The sound of the word strikes at this ganized concept and stirs a *meaning*. By convenient synechdoche this ncept represents the whole elaborately interconnectedly organized nconscious. This is essentially mnemonic : snow is recognized and nderstood, for instance, through previous experiences of it. The nconscious does not organize sensations or ideas like plums in a pudding as the separate pieces are arranged into a jigsaw puzzle. A visual nage of a tiger is not passed from the unconscious to the conscious as a cture is stored in a cellar and brought up to the showroom. There are nscious experiences of tigers ; their results are organized into the nconscious and the conscious visual image results from this. Blake's oetry is not an actual outline of his actual unconscious.

Memory organized in the unconscious prompts a swift automatic nderstanding of " the snow is a lovely nuisance " or " the Ice Age has me again ". This is the fundamental operation of the mnemonically ganized unconscious. In the far greater part of conscious experience, ough the mnemonic is the greater part of it, the experiencer does not alize it. In explicit recollection the rememberer knows that he remembers, most thinking the thinker does not. Each person organizes his wn " personal unconscious ", as Jung calls it—each baby kicks its wn kinaesthetic experiences into its own unconscious. Jung affirms collective unconscious ", identical as a universal " psychic foundation" each Western man that is not derived from personal experience. The rsonal unconscious, is admittedly the individual's private acquisition rough his own experiences, which contains his own set of memories.

Telepathy is more intelligible, as Price suggests, through a continuous nnection between minds other than by space or time. The unconscious

presents this alternative to radiation hypotheses very temptingly. Jill's conscious trouble affects her unconscious, hers affects Jack's, and his unconscious communicates Jill's plight consciously to him. This may happen intelligibly, Price suggests, if any two unconscious minds are not *causally* separated. There may be a field of mental interaction where unconscious events in one mind affect those in another. Any boundaries between unconscious minds, Price adds, are fuzzy, and in the deep unconscious an idea or feeling belongs as much to any one mind as to any other. Thus *distance* is irrelevant to the causal connection between minds, or, alternatively, in the deep unconscious it is always nil.

The tourist cannot see Helvellyn at all when he is in London, and very imperfectly when he is close to its base ; position constantly determines the widening prospect as the climber mounts ; the listener cannot hear out of auditory range. The place of the brain determines sense-perception and communication through it. The traveller can remember his journeys and think about telepathy in any tavern in any town, or on the moon if he can get there and live. He still thinks where his brain is, however, and his unconscious is continuous with his consciousness. If his brain is necessary for his consciousness, as must be assumed, then it is necessary for his unconscious. He seems, then, to be peculiarly dichotomized on Price's interpretation, for his brain separates his conscious mind from other conscious minds while his unconscious, which is continuous with his consciousness, mingles with every other unconscious.

According to Price's speculation each mind passes experiences into a pooled unconscious and receives from it. This causal openness of any mind to all others exposes it to a veritable avalanche of impressions—potentially at least. Any single consciousness would have an unconscious composed of experiences from other minds. Like Rogers' spirits in the next world, each unfortunate terrestial would have a veritably " global " experience. If an association between two ideas in one mind operates in all minds, as Carrington suggests and Price notes, no mind could do its own thinking.

Since any presumption involving such primary universal telepathy requires the speculative addition of a selective mechanism, Price adds it. A multitude, a veritable *multitude*, of processes jostling one another in any unconscious mind out of the path to any consciousness, as Price once suggests, is obviously a desperate resort. He suggests a *repressive* mechanism to prevent too free an access to a consciousness. " Repression " in psycho-analytical psychology, in Freud for instance, denies, *pushes* back as it were, and it acts *always*. A mind constantly *repressing* an ever increasing horde of processes from an ever increasing population, even if it knew what to repress, would be in a sorry plight. In psycho-analytical psychology repressed experiences *trouble* the unconscious ; the unconscious pool would be one continued disastrous effort for each conscious mind. In any event each conscious mind would be too busy

ith repression to do anything else.

Even an easy automatic exclusion *from consciousness* is not enough. 'hat animal goes on four feet in the morning, on two at noon, and on ree in the evening ? The answer to this version of the Sphinx's riddle, an, lies in the unconscious of the answerer. If he never hears the riddle s experiences have still been appropriately organized into his un- nscious. Countless experiences from innumerable minds cannot enter s unconscious from the pool without affecting it analogously. By fecting his unconscious they will, at least, affect his conscious mind idirectly, and he will have no unconscious proper to himself. Normally is unconscious must be causally separated from every other, and only usually connected on occasion. Telepathy is then secondary and casual, it seems to be, not primary and universal.

A turn on the steering wheel cuts out all directions for the moving car at one. Conscious attention, analogously, restricts the unconscious to ie relevant. An unconscious analogue of conscious attention may keep lepathic intruders out. Also, as the unconscious does intrude some, or any, irrelevancies on the attentively selective conscious, so one un- nscious may at times intrude telepathically upon another. In experi- ental telepathy the mind, by something analogous to conscious attention, ay dispose its unconscious to receive telepathic impressions. Price ggests that the good telepath may suspend repression by relaxing his tention.

As each unconscious organizes the conscious experiences of its own ind it may *set* into this attentive relation to them, and against the causal ction of any other unconscious. Telepathy happens when this auto- natic causal exclusion fails—or may happen. This still presumes telepathy y the unconscious route, though each unconscious is normally causally eparated from every other.

Ordinary communication by sense-perception through emanative nteraction indicates the essential separateness of minds. If their uncon- cious parts are not effectively separated they would be too telepathically t one another's mercy, or too blended together, to have the individuality nat they clearly exhibit.

Crusoe swam twice round the ship before he saw the rope to clamber p. Astronomy groped long before nuclear energy made the sun's terrific et unwasting stream of radiation intelligible. Speculation on telepathy swimming round and round the boat, and it looks as though it will ave to go on swimming.

The author is Hon. Lecturer in the History of Science at the University of Leeds.)

ACROSS AMERICA

By John Morris

WE came into San Francisco through the Golden Gate. It was cold, damp and foggy, with not even a hint of sunshine. There were not many passengers on the boat ; but because I had come from the Far East the immigration officer, who was friendly and apologetic, had delayed me. By the time I had told him what I could of conditions in Japan, most of the others had already left and I had some difficulty in finding a taxi. After a little time a rather battered Ford drove by and I hailed its Negro driver. The car was painted a brilliant yellow, and in large white letters which ran right across the body was the slogan 'Father Divine *is* God'. The porter who was carrying my bags hesitated when I told him to put them into the taxi—" In *that* ? " he said—and even the driver appeared to think I was not quite normal. When we got to the hotel the commissionaire outside received me coldly and asked me to wait. After a few moments a clerk came out. He looked searchingly at me, but after satisfying himself that my skin was white, and that as a foreigner I was not well acquainted with local custom, he told me that I might have a room. When I got to know him better he explained that while it was quite all right to ride in a taxi driven by a Negro, " white people " never in any circumstances used those of the sort in which I had arrived ; they were reserved for " coloured folk ".

After dining on Telegraph Hill I thought I would go back to the hotel and have an early night, but on my way I came to a Burlesque Theatre and decided to drop in and see what this kind of show, about which I had heard so much, was like. There was a jaded-looking chorus, the members of which could neither sing nor dance ; they looked bored and quite worn out. The strip-tease act, which is considered the high-spot of the performance, seemed to excite the audience to a frenzy. I thought it boring and very sordid. Most of the so-called jokes were concerned with homosexuality.

The next morning I was taken out to see the University of California, which is at Berkeley, across the bay from San Francisco. The campus is several miles from the ferry-station and is reached by an electric train which runs along the middle of the street. We passed a number of rather mean-looking little houses, very jerry-built ; and in its general effect this region seemed as sordid as a London suburb. In some ways the effect was even more dreary owing to the hard clear light, which does not soften

he landscape as does the more misty atmosphere of England. It is no xcuse for London's dinginess that it is sanctioned by age and tradition. Nevertheless, here the squalor seems more inexcusable because it is not ncient but young and new ; one feels that these streets always were qualid.

My friend was living in a small hotel near the University, in which, as it s within a radius of one mile of the campus, no alcoholic liquor may be old, so he is denied his daily glass of beer. It seems that this regulation vas brought in to prevent students from getting drunk in the University grounds. In practice all it means is that they are forced to walk a mile in order to buy a drink ; nor is there anything to stop them from buying iquor outside the limit and taking it back to their lodgings. I was told hat this senseless regulation was forced through by certain puritanical nembers of the faculty, whose consciences were thereby salved.

We had lunch with some of the professors, in an atmosphere thick with obacco smoke. Nothing could have been more unlike an Oxford or Cambridge Common Room, for this place reminded me of a quick-lunch estaurant. When we had finished, one of the staff, a refugee from Germany, showed us round his own department. He said that before vorking in an American university one should ideally have had some preliminary training as a gaoler, for innumerable are the doors one has onstantly to lock and unlock.

Berkeley is very proud of its lecture halls. I was shown one which ould accommodate fifteen hundred students. It was fitted up with oud speakers and indirect lighting, and reminded me of one of London's nore intimate and exclusive cinemas. After this we were shown the tudents' co-operative shop, a huge combined drug store, restaurant and book shop. It seemed an excellent idea that the books were displayed as hey would be in a modern shop, and salesmen were inducing students to buy. The restaurant looked big enough to seat about two hundred at a ime. At the entrance was a small kiosk, apparently a fountain-pen iller-stand, from which long strips of rag hung down on which to wipe one's pen.

During our walk through the campus my companion expressed his urprise at seeing four Negro students. He appeared to be genuinely hocked to see them in friendly conversation with some white Americans. He told me that during his five years at Harvard he had come across only one, and he, poor guy, had committed suicide before the end of his course.

Before leaving the University I was presented with a copy of *Pictorial California*. " The University of California," it notes, " with its huge campus and many fine buildings is the cultural center and one of the most admired beauty spots of Metropolitan Oakland. The towering spire of he Campanile silhouetted against the green of the Berkeley Hills dominates he campus and may be seen from San Francisco across the Bay. Housed at the top of the Campanile are melodious chimes which sound the hours

and which the University Chime Master plays on special occasions. More than ten thousand young men and women attend the University of California, which lists among its graduates many of the great names in science, economics and industry."

I left San Francisco early on a Sunday morning, travelling on the "Daylight", one of America's famed air-conditioned trains, in which the atmosphere was similar to that of a Swiss hotel in the depth of winter and therefore unbearably stuffy. The Pullman car was fitted with radio and a regular battery of loud speakers, and we pulled out of the station to the strains of Liszt's 2nd Hungarian Rhapsody, which Mr. Stokowsky has so successfully vulgarized. I find it painful at any time ; in a crowded train, and before breakfast, it is intolerable. A woman in the seat next to mine began to make up her face at 7.15 and looked at herself in a pocket mirror at fifteen-minute intervals all the way to Los Angeles. After I had observed her applying lipstick twenty times I ceased to count. Just before she got off the train I discovered, to my disgust, that she was not American but an English girl in search of fame.

Another woman, on the other side of the gangway, spent about thirty minutes looking through a pile of magazines about three feet high, after which she asked the newsboy for one he hadn't got. A great many people sent telegrams from the train and most seemed to want to buy something that was unobtainable on the car. I got the impression that many Americans wait until they board a train before doing their shopping. This particular one contained even a beauty parlour and a barber's shop. The radio continued at full blast all the way to Los Angeles.

Soon after leaving San Francisco I went along to the dining car to get some breakfast. It was full, so I took the only empty stool at the end intending to wait until someone should vacate a place at the counter. Shortly afterwards a man and woman came in so I got down and offered her my seat. Before she could take it, however, the man pushed her out of the way and sat down himself.

Light snow was falling when we pulled into El Paso, and it had become bitterly cold. The Negroes on the platform had a peculiarly pinched expression and looked as out of place as do Europeans in the tropics. The Arizona desert reminded me of the North West Frontier of India, but seen from the train, its most remarkable feature is a gigantic cactus, six to eight feet high. The little towns through which we passed consisted mostly of decrepit shacks, and on the edge of each was a heap of broken-down automobiles in the last stages of rusting decay. Many of the river-beds contained piles of old tins and other junk.

During the journey across to New Orleans I had the bad luck to break a filling in one of my teeth, so before setting out to look at the city I went first to a dentist recommended by the hotel. The place was very different from an English dentist's surgery, being a long row of semi-open cubicles arranged, like a barber's shop, without privacy. I was first interviewed

y an overpainted middle aged woman (" Call me Ireen," she said) with a
outhful of forbidding dentures which were hardly an advertisement for
er employers. " What's your name," she said without further pre-
minaries, and I gave her the necessary reply. " Morris what ? ", she
ontinued. " Morris nothing , " I answered , " it happens to be my
rname." " What's that ? You'd be meaning your family name, I
ppose. Say, you must be British ? " " What makes you think that?"
said. " Well, I thought at first you must be from Boston, but even they
on't talk quite as sissy as you. Anyhow, what can we do for you, Mr.
lorris ? " I told her what I wanted and she asked me to open my mouth.
O.K.," she said. " It'll be six dollars, and you can pay me right now."
did so and was left to wait. After about fifteen minutes I was
mmoned to one of the cubicles. The doctor, like his fellows, wore a
ort white coat with his name embroidered in red letters across the
ocket. While we were waiting for the cement to harden he became
nversational. " You're a stranger here, I guess," he said. " Well, *sir*,
is is the most historic place in the United States. Yes, *sir*. Every
use in this town has helped to make history ; a tour round the old
uarters will give you a good idea of what Europe is like." I told him I
as English. " Is that so ? " he went on. " Well I reckon you'll feel
home down here. Don't bite on that tooth for an hour. Thank
u."

While wandering along the main street of New Orleans I was accosted
y a man who introduced himself as Louis Garritson. He had noticed,
e said, that I was a foreigner, and begged to offer his services as a guide.
espite all my efforts to explain that I preferred to discover the city by
yself, he refused to be shaken off so that in the end I was forced to give
. He was the son of a Dutch father and a French mother and was
xtremely proud of his European associations although he had never
avelled even as far as New York. At first I found it difficult to under-
and what he was saying. " We are passing down a Joyman Street," he
id ; but I did not at first realize that what he meant was a " German
treet." Incidentally, the whole city is divided into racial quarters :
ere are Creole (which here means a mixture of French and Spanish),
rench, German, Spanish, white American, Negro and various other
uarters. Americans, and more particularly those from the South, do
ot like their attitude towards the Negroes to be criticized by foreigners.
levertheless, during a long residence in India, where British relations
ith the people have often been the subject of bitter American criticism, I
ever saw anything so degrading as conditions in New Orleans, where
e Negroes appear to have very few rights. They may not, for instance,
tend a " white " church, and in the cinemas are allowed only in the topmost
allery. In no circumstances are they allowed to occupy sleeping-berths
n the trains, and they may only travel in special compartments on the
ams and buses. A white man may not travel in a taxi driven by a

Negro ; cannot take a Negro friend in a taxi with him. It is in fact regarded almost as a criminal offence to be seen talking to a Negro. " But," said Louis, " here we love the Negroes and help them when they are down, whereas up in the North, where they have been given equal rights, they can shove you off the sidewalk, if they don't like the look of you, so everybody hates them." I gathered that what he meant was that in the South people love the Negroes with the same sort of affection they have for their pet dogs. " But no," he said, " they really love the old black mammy what raised 'em up."

This racial discrimination seems particularly unjust in the case of the so-called " White Negroes," many of whom seemed to me indistinguishable from people of pure white ancestry. The majority are fairer skinned than the Creoles who, owing to their alleged Spanish ancestry (but in which there is, I suspect, a strain of Indian blood) are often very dark. In the South, however, the slightest drop of Negro blood, no matter how many generations distant, means that a man is classified as a Negro and treated as such. Such people, so Louis told me, sometimes refer to themselves as Creoles, but they cannot get away with it for long. Their only chance is to emigrate to the North.

I thought the Metairie cemetery by far the most interesting sight in New Orleans. It is entirely Roman Catholic, to which church the majority of the local population belongs. No Negro, however rich or eminent, may be buried within its walls. Because New Orleans is built upon a swamp the ordinary kind of grave is unsuitable, so the custom has arisen of building immense tombs, some of them large enough to contain twenty or thirty bodies. Most of these tombs are highly ornate and many families invest their life's savings in building a monument that shall be bigger and better than that of any of their neighbours. The famous Campo Santo at Genoa, which is in some ways similar to Metairie, contains many monuments of great beauty, but the cemetery at New Orleans is entirely devoid of artistic merit ; most of the tombs are merely vulgar displays of wealth and it is hardly possible to imagine a more ridiculous and pathetic series of monuments to human pride.

After leaving the cemetery we went out to have a look at Shushan Airport, one of the finest I have ever seen. The main building is constructed entirely of marble, imported at immense cost. The walls have, however, been covered over with stucco in order to protect the marble from damage.

In the train on the way to Florida I got into a conversation with a soldier who had fought in the 1914—1918 war. He was more or less intoxicated when he came into my compartment and became offended when I declined politely to share his bottle with him. " The trouble with you British," he said, " is that you've no sense of humour." He elaborated on this theme for several hundred miles, but just as I was reaching the stage of desperation and wondering how to escape he got ready to leave

he train. " Don't take my remarks seriously, pal," he said as he was bout to leave. " I'm nuts. I came out of an army Bug-house two weeks go and I'm on my way to another."

In Miami I stayed in an hotel, built in mock Spanish-Mission style, which looked like a huge movie-set. I found it to be patronized almost xclusively by the sort of vulgar rich Jews who give their race a bad name. Many of them wore the most astonishing clothes, the kind only normally worn by chorus boys in a Broadway musical. Vivid blue suits are popular during the daytime, but at night most of the men wear black trousers, double-breasted Palm Beach dinner jackets of some pastel shade, nd a bow tie with handkerchief to match of some startling colour. Everything they wear suggests exaggeration ; the colours are too bright ; he bow ties are too large. They all look overfed and most of them are much too fat.

The most astonishing thing about the hotel is a completely equipped tockbroker's office, which on sunny mornings is moved out on to the eashore so that clients may carry on with their transactions without interrupting their sun-bathing.

There is also a private cinema in the hotel to which the latest films are brought by air from Hollywood, several dance bands, professional dancers and a cabaret every night at half-past twelve. On each floor of he hotel, just outside the elevator, is a small table containing a huge basket piled high with delicious fruits and the most expensive-looking chocolates I have ever seen. Guests are supposed to help themselves in case they should be overcome by hunger while waiting for the lift. The roof of the hotel is arranged for those who wish to do their sun-bathing n a more scientific manner and under supervision. I noticed a large class of corpulent gentlemen attempting to counteract the effects of over eating. While they were being put through their paces by an instructor, he latest Wall Street prices were shouted through a loud-speaker.

This hotel is not exceptional ; there are hundreds like it all along the Florida coast. There is nothing in Europe with which they may be compared, and until one has stayed in one it is not possible to understand he full meaning of vulgarity. Everything is completely artificial ; a mile from the hotel there is nothing but desert. Even the palm trees growing on the beach have been brought from a distance. This particular part of Florida is arranged entirely for the amusement of rich people. There are no restrictions upon gambling and even a licence to drive a car s unnecessary. Beyond a few miserable house sparrows I saw no birds n the hotel grounds, but presumably they would be imported should he demand for them ever arise.

It costs about eight pounds a day to stay in one of these hotels, but the experience is worth it once. The French manager of the one in which I tayed told me that on New Year's night he had sold fifteen hundred dollars' worth of champagne ; all of it, he added with contempt, of a

brand no connoisseur would drink. But the sun and sea in Florida are lovely. I left the place cogitating on the strange paradox that people are prepared to spend very considerable sums of money in order to darken their skin to a colour which, if it were real and not acquired, would mean social ostracism in the particular circles in which they move.

In Washington I felt I had got a grip on life again ; it was like waking up out of an opium dream to find real people doing a real job of work. The town is beautifully laid out and reminded me of Paris.

One morning in early January we drove out under an azure sky along the banks of the Potomac to Mount Vernon. There was a crust of frost on the road and the naked trees were all rime covered. From the rotting leaves underfoot there came a smell like that of the English countryside. The house has been left just as it was when the Washington family occupied it. Walking through its quiet rooms, with their exquisite Colonial furniture, one felt almost like a trespasser, as though at any moment some members of the family would appear and ask us to go away. Standing on the porch and gazing over the wide sweep of river I realized suddenly that I no longer felt an alien in this country ; that the people who had lived in this quiet country house were the same sort as my own ancestors. I should never again feel a stranger in America.

I got to New York just as dusk was falling on a Sunday night, a perfect introduction to its magical unreality. I had asked to be given a bedroom on the top floor of my gigantic hotel and I sat there at the open window until the biting cold drove me away. The New York scene has been made so familiar that the stranger knows almost exactly what to expect. Nevertheless, when one is actually confronted with this concrete forest of skyscrapers it seems at first impossible to believe that it is real. I have since visited New York several times, but even now I cannot cease to wonder at its architectural beauty. I stood on Fifth Avenue and leaning backwards gazed up towards the summit of the Empire State Building. I went several times to the platform on the top and stared down at the remote ants walking along Fifth Avenue ; and even now I just cannot believe that it really exists. I know I shall do this every time I return to New York and that I shall never cease to marvel at the fantastic beauty of this building. It makes me feel that in spite of everything there is still a hope for modern man.

I left New York in a blinding snowstorm and when I hurried up the gangway at midnight the decks of the *Berengaria* were quite frozen and tiny icicles hung from her rigging. Six days later, when the train pulled into Victoria, I felt as though I had arrived at a small provincial town, a town that had been somehow stunted in its youth and never grown to its proper height. But it was good to be at home in London again. I took a taxi to the house and there was my mother, in her usual place by the fire, about to make the afternoon tea, the flames from the burning logs flickering in the silver tea things, lighting up the backs of the books. It seemed as though I had never been away.

FESTE

By Ruth Tomalin

AS I went down toward the summer sea,
over the barley where the seagull grieves,
I saw the west wind roaring in the sheaves,
and, dancing in the sun, a cypress tree
that laughed with all its leaves.

Shut in beyond the winter waters crying
the fire and moonlight blaze together, glance
on the unravelled steps like seabirds flying,
the tides of merriment like barley sighing
at Feste's dance.

He had the morning star to his bright nurse,
whose splendid pencil dinted on his face
a document in laughter : and, perverse,
drew from the goblins of the universe
a furious grace.

The summer of his singing idiom burns
to delicate slim fooling in the sun ;
the tendrils of his fair hair jig like ferns :
with mockery and melody by turns
the charm is spun.

So Mercury might play at Pantaloon,
in thistledown caprice, and a gazelle
spin such a mad reel underneath the moon
to trip the heart and weave the watcher soon
within his spell.

The shades go down upon the candled hall :
I saw an arrow pointing to the sea—
the shadow of a lordling cypress tree
turned dark and still from sun and moonlight, fall
to a wild reverie.

OF A GARDEN

By S. L. Bensusan

I AM often reminded that a garden is the last and greatest delight left to the years that have passed the limit set by Psalm 90; Francis Bacon did not err when he said that it is the purest of human pleasures. How easy to understand why great Diocletian walking " In the Salonian garden's noble shade " paused to refuse to return to the throne! There was nothing to praise in the life of the Emperor, but his resolve to prefer a garden to a kingdom makes some atonement. Evelyn tells us that gardening has ever been the amusement chosen by the greatest men " for the unbending of their thoughts and to retire from the world " but happily garden solace is not limited to the great. The humblest among us may have the good fortune to possess a garden and to find joy in its service; he knows he has engaged in a task that cannot be brought to an end, that he is committed to a struggle that can only bring defeat and yet his pleasure remains unaffected. Somebody may follow him and keep trim paths and beds and borders and if this is not to be, he has the satisfaction of knowing that for a time at least he kept the forces of chaos at bay. He has rescued and cultivated beauty, surrounded himself with lovely fruits of labour and found in that labour a cure for most of the little troubles that infest his day.

The world may have no further use for you, your best friends may " have drunk the cup a round or two before," neighbours may be utterly uncongenial, pains and aches that lie in wait for the elderly may pay unwelcome visits, but choose a task in the garden, set to it with what vigour and determination you can command and all the limitations fit into their place as part of the established order of things, while the garden, or some little corner, grows in health and beauty under your hands. Perhaps you are not skilful, perhaps what skill you had is lost; be sure there will be enough left to enable you to leave something better than you found it. What tree, shrub, flower will not be the happier when you have cleared the surrounding weeds, forked the soil, given water or a mulch where needed, trimmed and trained to enable beauty to be more clearly expressed?

From earliest spring to latest autumn the garden invites and when the winter holds it in thrall you should have fruit on your shelves and honey in the store and, if you have been wise, a measure of home-made wine and cordials to cheer you as you sit by a log fire and make plans for another

ear. There is a sense of satisfaction when you pause to enumerate the rees, shrubs and flowers that will face a coming season in happier state ecause you served them ; when fine days arrive it may be possible to o out for an hour pruning or enjoying the chrysanthemums, cyclamens nd cinerarias that live under glass and can laugh at the vain attempt of ing Frost to touch them with death-dealing fingers. If you have no lass you may have a few plants in the house ; there is no day in the year hen you cannot enjoy the delight of green things growing. In this, ny latest and last of gardens, the soil is very light, so light that the local ise folk assured me that nothing would grow. They stand convicted f gross error to-day, but the price of growth has been sustained labour. Ay first task was to make compost to enrich the soil, to bring leaf mould rom the wood and cow or horse manure from the meadow and the ourney was up-hill all the way. I barred mineral fertilizers and ucceeded in giving the soil the humus that it asked for, but in a normal ear the prolonged droughts of early summer still tax it to the uttermost. ortunately we have abundant water ; if we had the necessary labour the bsence of rain would not matter. To-day I search diligently for all causes f real distress and bring first aid. Among the trees that have struggled nto life from the very article of death is a Siberian Crab and a graceful aburnum ; there is also a very old ribes ; dying when I found it, that will now outlive its rescuer.

But for sustained help, all must have been lost to the garden ; they would have found no place in a pageant of enchanted hours. There are ess conspicuous growths, bergamot an outstanding example, that have udden spasms of weakness because the sky is cloudless ; revive them, and n the following morning they will express their gratitude in terms of colour and fragrance. Often, late in the spring, I go among favourites eady to help and if I wake in the small hours to the sweep and rush of ain, the sense of relief is heartfelt. God's in His Heaven all's right with ny little garden world. In a way careful attention given to the land is an ntimate and personal matter. I do not talk about it ; there is not a ree, shrub or flower that must be regarded as on the dole ; the only means test is an outward sign of distress. White jasmine is one of my avourites and never lacks a helping hand ; over the porch where honey-uckle and clematis meet, their splendid growth is due in part to the regular dressing and watering so gladly given.

Gradually, as the claims of the garden strengthen with the waxing year, to remain insistent until autumn comes along, the appeals of the outer world fade and become unsubstantial. There is something friendly and sociable about a garden ; woodland for all its beauty overpowers. I spend a sunny hour or so on any day willing to grant one among the forest trees that ring me round on the south, the oaks and elms, beeches and chestnuts, silver birch and holly that rise above great beauty of elder, gorse, and broom. They delight me but must remain aloof, they have no

need of first aid ; it would be utterly ineffective ; not for them the weakness and beauty of a garden bed. It is for me to take what they give and to keep them well away from the timber merchants whose seductive offers are rejected as regularly as they are repeated, to safeguard the wild life that finds shelter among them, to watch with a feeling akin to reverence through the hours when they renew their life. I like to think that I shall have left many more trees on the face of this fair county than I found when I entered it first in the Victorian years. But to go to the wood is to take part in a ceremonial occasion ; you are briefly received and slip away among the uncounted folk ; to go back to the garden is to enter once more into the circle of familiar friends waiting to welcome you ; the sensations are altogether different.

Even when winter arrives and the garden only admits brief visits, its colour and fragrance remain with you in jars and bottles ; these have a special quality of their own. Nothing you could buy, though it might be presented more attractively and with alluring labels can compare with what has been made at home. Sloe wine and plum wine, mountain ash conserve, elderberry cordial, tomato purée, jams and jellies of all kinds should be destined to follow another season from birth to fulfilment. Perhaps thought of that season to come may carry you over the dead end of winter while the sun repents slowly of its idleness and remembers that the eight-hour day and sixteen-hour n ght press hardly upon mankind in these post-war years. Certain it is that the offering made by the garden for winter use pays handsomely for the pleasant trouble demanded from the beginning of March to the end of October and not all the efforts of the food factories can replace stores of our own growing.

There is not much to be said for winter by the garden lover, but it is worth noting that the value of every flower left to us is enhanced. Winter jasmine, Christmas roses, winter aconite, sparkle of gorse from beyond the garden boundary, the early spray of honeysuckle leaf, the first sign of life on an elder bush, the upthrust of the cow parsley, how eagerly we welcome these ; it is as though our capacity for admiration were strictly limited and only when nature has reduced her gifts to a minimum can we pay adequate tribute. So it is with the birds that haunt the garden. At a time when many are nesting and their song is in full flow, we cannot offer full meed of praise and thankfulness, but when the garden is bereft and night arrives black and inhospitable and a lone thrush sings from a bare bough, the sense of gratitude is overwhelming. I think of what the blackbirds and thrushes have given me when an indignant gardener complains that they are too active among the currants and raspberries and I do my best to persuade him that we are in debt to the birds and if they take payment in fruit it cannot justly be withheld. I'm not prepared to say that this view is always well received, but it prevails. No bird dies because it loves my fruit.

Something rings true in the Biblical story that Adam and Eve were

established in a garden, the garden of rest and peace in which they were not content to dwell. Even to this day their descendants find in a garden the greatest of all delights and turn with pleasure to follow the miracle of growth whether it be in the hot-house of a lordly estate or on the crowded allotment of a city suburb. I recall gratefully a visit paid to the area of the docks when the Huns had done the one piece of destruction for which praise is due and had levelled acres of horrible dwellings that shamed the national prosperity. In one bleak and devastated area some six or eight mean houses had escaped, two had gardens and in each flowers were growing as though to defy the squalor and horror of destruction on every side. And, being in one of London's most fashionable quarters where stately buildings crashed, I saw how from among the ruins a carpet of greenery had been laid down with weeds despised and rejected in the country but looking beautiful and exotic around the rubble and rubbish they had elected to transfigure—never were ragwort and willow herb seen to greater advantage.

Even the most hardened and prosaic among us cultivate a garden, a real *hortus inclusus*, one to which we admit few if any, a garden of memories. Those memories may stretch far away back " to the very May morn of our youth," they will have gathered fresh flowers and new perfumes along the road until the time comes when, looking back, we realize that those who planted or tended the flowers we loved have gone ahead into the unknown and then we continue to cultivate a garden of shadows for their sake. A very successful and very self-satisfied man may neglect this garden for a while but the chances are that the time will come when he will turn to it for a contemplation and meditation, however brief. He may even find that some of the long neglected flowers have preserved a savour that his worldly growths could never yield. But perhaps the happiest man is he who has both gardens, one that all can see and one that is open to him alone; he can raise any of the flowers in the garden lover's calendar, provided the soil be suitable, and he can grow the flowers of his fancy too. Sometimes these are one and the same. I tend white jasmine with unnecessary care, feeding and watering and training, but while I do so my thoughts travel back to a plain iron staircase leading from a tiny morning room to a small garden. A lifetime has passed since I picked the jasmine there, the old house has been blasted by bombs and the garden is a ruin, but not to me who can call it back so clearly in all the simple beauty of those years. I train climbing roses to reach to tree tops and while I do so, can see in my other garden the roses that adorn the bowered houses and outer walls of Banias and Damascus, of all roses the loveliest. I have a mimosa tree in the shelter of a bank and a large bush in a pot that is brought into the house to flower but in my other garden there is a view over a hill side blazing down to the edge of the Mediterranean with mimosa spread like gorse or broom. My open garden is thrall to the seasons, my memory garden flowers all through the year and knows

nothing of winter. Sometimes in due season a bowl of oranges is on the table and I turn to the corner of the private garden where part of an orange orchard in Jaffa scents the air over great spaces. So stray flowers can recall gardens in Portugal, Italy and the Greek Islands ; these are things intimate and undiscussed, but infinitely pleasant. It is impossible to remember all details. A great blaze, with scarlet predominant, recalls an enclosure surrounding a little railway station in Southern Spain and there are many other stimuli to memory to be met round my own or friends' houses ; if they die with one season they are re-born with its successor. Mortality and gardens are incompatible.

I remember a very delightful pleasaunce in the heart of woodlands, a garden of friendship in which all manner of distinguished men and women who lived in and beyond mid-Victorian times had planted trees, bushes or flowers. Perhaps the ghosts of those who enjoyed the occasions haunted the garden in the season when the chatelaine had grown grey and years had robbed her of what had seemed to be inexhaustible vitality. Still the birds nested and sang their love songs without seeming to break the silence and a very old and feeble gardener found his last task in tending the paths and keeping exuberant undergrowth in check ; he, too, seemed like a man in a dream. Of those who were honoured not one will be left to-day ; their trees and bushes had lost the memorial plates when I visited the garden last, in years before the war broke out. *Sic transit gloria.*

The world's most devoted gardeners are, or have been, the farm workers of rural Britain ; the men and women who often with no more than forty rods, a quarter of an acre, raised vegetables and bush fruit for their household and gave long hours on summer nights when the hard labours of the fields were over. I am old enough to remember parsons who denounced the working man's practice of spending Sunday in his garden ; they said it was a sin against Christianity. When I reminded one of them of the saying of Jesus, " the Sabbath was made for man ", he was very displeased. Happily there were not many villages in which these objections carried any weight, but merely to recall them is to bring back a world in which selfishness, intolerance and greed were virtues practised by the comfortable classes. I can recall the men in their eighties who could still cultivate a garden, men who had what they call a green finger—what they planted would grow and thrive. " Father," said the married daughter of one of them, " never missed a day in the garden and one afternoon he came in at tea-time and set in the ingle and allowed he was reg'lar wanked. He took a cup o' tea and went to sleep and he never woke up no more. He was in his eighty-fower an' never saw a doctor all his born days."

Perhaps we can best imagine what gardens mean to us by thinking of a world in which no gardens were to be found, a world without any cultivation other than that needed for food, a world from which beauty had been

xpelled to make way for utility. The towns might endure though public arks and squares would be missed, but the country divorced from gardens ıust needs be unendurable and none would wish to live there. There ould be nothing to look for in the years that are given to a repose that is ften hard-won ; there would be no break in the life of the town worker ho to-day finds in a small garden or even an allotment a sense of con- entment that is not to be met elsewhere. Food, shelter, books and a arden are the necessities of a full life and it would be hard to give them n order of merit if starvation and exposure were not more serious hreats to life than ignorance and ugliness ; we know we must have food nd shelter and we know that many must live without books and beauty. 3ut when we look round the world and ask ourselves in all seriousness vhat, after human companionship, has given us the greatest pleasure, the nost complete recreation and satisfaction, how many will refuse pride of place to the garden ?

For a large army of thoughtful folk the charm of the world we live n is held by a garden and hard work brings swift reward ; it is a domain, e it large or small, in which we express ourselves more freely than we an do elsewhere, a tiny fragment of Mother Earth that has yielded its ecrets, in which we can learn after a course of trial and error that nature s conquered by obedience. In our garden, perhaps in our study too, we njoy the state of contentment in which we cannot envy the King on his hrone, the statesman at his government bench, the hero of the crowd. This is as it should be for, so far as the world is concerned we come from he earth and we are going back to the earth and to leave her more beautiful han we found her is a gracious and becoming act. Nor is love and dmiration for gardens a special attribute of the western world, though ours are the best cared for of any. The Mohammedan paradise is a garden hrough which rivers flow, an orchard full of the finest fruit that grows within reach of the hand. In the literature of the Arabs the garden plays ts part and is often chosen as the scene of wise and philosophic discourse. Saadi and Omar Khayyam provide two instances with which most people ire familiar while some Arab poetry too erotic for free circulation is written round gardens. From them poets and teachers addressed a world hat is listening after a lapse of centuries. In gardens I recognize the most gracious and yet the most implacable of all my teachers and after nearly seventy years' tuition remain a willing and a grateful pupil.

GEORGES DUHAMEL

By L. A. Triebel

WITHIN a few hours of the liberation of Paris in 1944, the French National Committee of Writers made a short and dignified statement They represented no one class of political thought or literary school. Old and young had formed this organization in face of the mortal peril to their country and to civilization. In the very darkness of occupation, they proclaimed among themselves, with infinite precautions in view of the odds against them, and to the outer world that freedom of the spirit without which truth is mocked and creative work impossible. They pledged themselves to strive for full victory, the new France and world security. The first signature to the little document was Georges Duhamel's.

Many of Georges Duhamel's wartime sketches are just descriptions of old Paris, of his youthful haunts, of his people, so well pictured in the Pasquier novels The 1914—1918 war had inspired him to write *Civilisation*. All his sensitive soul was poured into that novel, probably the greatest literary product of its time. More selective, more spiritual than Barbusse or Remarque, Georges Duhamel set down his human reaction to war as he lived it during four years of front-line service. Its influence did not harden him ; he has always risen above cynicism. Actually, his two long novel-cycles, the *Salavin* and the *Pasquier*, are set in the world before 1914, but his descriptions of civilized society were illuminated by a new vision of understanding sympathy.

Like his Laurent Pasquier, Duhamel grew up in Paris under conditions of economic stringency, but with his natural gifts he won through to become a doctor of medicine and a writer of progressive views, interested in music and poetry. Laurent Pasquier is the young Duhamel. Then, soon after he lived in another world, that of war. Here he performed many emergency operations, witnessed suffering stoically borne, unrelieved by any glamour except that of indomitable pluck. A change came over him ; set in his spiritual doubts, one noble flame burned steadfastly—his faith in the individual soul. His *New Book of Martyrs* was a cry of anguish and of vicarious suffering ; his *Civilisation* was a bitter satire on values revealed in the melting-pot of modern war.

At his admission to the French Academy, he said : " We know that man alone, the individual, is capable of every fault and every excess, yet, nevertheless, we find in him our surest, indeed, our only, grounds for hope. He is imperfect, but prefectible . . . his virtues are the spirit of sacrifice, mercy, self-denial, renunciation." For him no "-ism", except humanism, matters. So, after a visit to America, in one of his travel books, he says of the man versus the machine: "I know, Mr. Pickleton, I know, I see; it's all admirable. Much more so, I admit, than the shops of my native village. . . . Everything sterilized on the grand scale. I repeat, everything admirable. Admirable and hopeless."

Soon, however, he came to write : " One joy is surely the greatest in my life—that of being the father of a child." Is not that a confident expression of faith ? His ideas developed, searchingly deep, in brilliant sketches and essays, like those of *Fables from my Garden* and *In Defence of Letters*. But as a creative writer Georges Duhamel will stand or fall by the *Salavin* series and *The Pasquier Chronicles*. I believe he will live by the latter. " I must confess," said Henri Bordeaux, " that I prefer *The Pasquier Chronicles* to *Salavin* because I prefer people who are alive to those only trying to be alive."

With the Pasquiers, Georges Duhamel faced full reality and turned his back on illusion. His characters are part of countless humble little dramas of everyday life. In *The Notary from Le Havre*, a family waits for years while an aunt's legacy is expected. All their actions are governed by this expectation and every reader will share their suffering and happiness. And how varied and individual the Pasquiers appear ;

understanding narrator, Laurent, at the centre of things ; Dr. Raymond Pasquier, mplex, headstrong father, full of faults, yet disarming ; the worldly, successful est son, Joseph ; the mediocre second son, Ferdinand ; Cecile, the elder daughter, a sical genius ; the lovely baby of the family, Susanne ; the mother, Madame Pasquier, saint of the " little " things of life, the true conserver of their heritage.

Georges Duhamel observes and records, conscious of both the sublime and ridiculous human nature. In his analysis of human personalities he is half biologist, half manitarian. He is pessimistic about outward progress, but holds to an underlying th that man can and will win through. He can see two sides to every question. His le is subtle but, unlike Proust's, always clear in the expression of his thoughts. His oughts are free, but always reasoned, ordered. That is why he loves music. He ads for the individual's spiritual freedom ; but, like Anatole France, at the same ne he sees the necessity for self-discipline. Politically he could not endorse either volution or dictatorship—the one for him is too disorderly, the other too severe a ntrol. Ultimately, his concern is with the individual soul and the things of the man spirit which for him is divine. His background is typically French, but his udy is mankind.

His two war books, the *New Book of Martyrs* and *Civilisation*, written almost at the dside of dying soldiers, are sincere, pathetic, with a strain of humour and filled with keen sense of comradeship. He saw real men at close range and found his faith in the dividual increased, but his confidence in a civilization based on scientific material was aken. In *Civilisation* he presented a programme for moral and spiritual reconstruction. e must turn to a simpler way of living, find true joy in ourselves and in all that is ost human around us. Material possessions and progress cannot make us happy—dly the kingdom within our hearts, love, nature, art, music, brotherhood.

The Salavin books told a story of human inadaptability in humble people. Salavin, nsitive and generous, just could not " belong " anywhere—he is a study in inhibitions d perhaps the story of all mankind should it ever lose faith. In the Pasquier novels urent, the boy, questions life and wonders at its varying standards. Like Zola, and alsworthy in *The Forsyte Saga*, Georges Duhamel traces the natural history of a family. nese sketches offer no clear political programme, yet there is implied the desire for a oral revolution to ensure social justice, to prevent wars, and to make the world no nger a lair of wild beasts.

How friendships, love of nature and the fine arts can make men happy is revealed in e *Fables from my Garden*, joyful with the charm of common things—flowers, animals, ople—seen through the eyes of a scientist, nature-lover, and philosopher, who serves, reasons, and understands with almost mystic insight. We must possess the orld in our hearts by a sort of communion, by giving ourselves to others. So he picts with deep sympathy his dog, Dick, surprises the world's secrets, and wins ppiness by learning pity for sufferers groping along the path of destiny.

After more than thirty years of working and writing, Georges Duhamel emerges as an tegrated personality. His instinctive sympathy with and belief in humanity are the urce of his finest creations. The years of war nearly destroyed him, but instead of utting his eyes to the agony of reality, he accepts and understands. Out of this ceptance, the artist has erected his faith in the divinity of man. His nearest parallels modern literature are perhaps Galsworthy and Romain Rolland. But his modesty ill endear him to all who admire the silent heroism that never turned its back on man suffering nor closed its eyes to those queer, sensitive unhappinesses that at some ne or another all of us have known.

In my youth, it used to be fashionable to class Georges Duhamel with the Unanimistes ", poets and artists, like Walt Whitman, Verhaeren and Jules Romains, no drew their inspiration from crowds, from the teeming multitude of men and omen. And he has remained a democrat, for human life to him is holy ground.

THE CRISIS IN THE LAW OF NATIONS, by H. A. Smith. *Stevens and Sons.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

This book, which ought to be read by every one interested in International Law, is based on five lectures given by the learned author at the University of Istanbul, and is a thorough investigation of the perils that now beset International Law, and that are traced to the infection of the Marxist Nazi systems.

With all respect to Dr. Smith, there are several propositions that are open to contrary arguments Such is the allegation that the " belief in totalitarianism has in a greater or less degree penetrated into almost every country." Again, I do not agree with the author's adverse criticism of the war crimes trials at Nuremberg ; it is a topic that was discussed in an earlier issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY.* First, he regards the charge of waging, and conspiring to wage, aggressive war as a violation of the fundamental principle, *nulla poena sine lege.* His dismissal of the Kellogg Pact, 1928, as a " half-hearted attempt to justify " the trial, because there were many violations of the Pact between 1928 and 1939, seems to be based on the very questionable assumption that law ceases to exist merely because breaches of it are not immediately redressed. Secondly, he states that another fundamental principle that was violated was impartiality. It is quite true that the ideal form of trial would have been by representatives of States which had taken no part in the 1939-1945 war, but we would urge that it is important to consider the actual methods by which the trials were conducted and the fact that some of the accused were acquitted. Can it possibly be said that there could have been a fairer hearing given to the accused ? Again, it might be, and indeed was, argued that the victors in the war would have been morally justified in punishing the offenders by taking executive action, without giving them any judicial trial. What the victors actually did was in harmony with natural justice, and on that ground alone the Nuremberg trials were of first-rate importance in the endeavour to prevent further war crimes.

The difficulties of maintaining the earlier law of contraband are well examined and it is rightly deduced that the modern tendency of belligerent States to organize the whole of their populations for military purposes makes the distinction between contraband and non-contraband goods practically impossible, at any rate where the goods are directly destined to the other belligerent.

The chapter on the United Nations Organization is instructive on the defects of the rules which created it, quite apart from what their practical effect might be. So far, the actual working of UNO has strongly exemplified the view that many of us expressed before it began—that its success would depend entirely on the spirit in which its members applied the rules governing the Organization. Until Russia subordinates its national politics to international welfare, there is not much prospect of the successor of the League of Nations doing more satisfactory work than its predecessor, in the maintenance and promotion of international peace. It is nevertheless possible that the true spirit may become more generally adopted by the members of UNO, and it is for this reason that I regard as premature the pessimistic conclusion of Dr. Smith that " the war practice has now developed the method of conference as a specialized and highly efficient machinery for the public aggravation of international discord."

P. H. WINFIELD.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS, by E. H. Carr. *Macmillan.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

Anyone setting out to study the perplexing state of international rela-

* " War Crimes and the Future of International law." By P. H. Winfield. March 1946.

ions will find in this book an admirable prelude. Professor Carr traces the main features of international politics and his picture is so firmly and accurately drawn that few readers are likely to question its general correctness or to quarrel with the soundness of his judgment. Though he confines himself for the most part to the orderly presentation of the facts, the overriding issue of this troubled period becomes very clear as his narrative proceeds.

The question which faced the last generation was whether the League of Nations could build up a peace-system based on principles generally accepted and secured by collective action for the prevention of war, or whether the world would relapse into the power-politics which had produced the first great upheaval. Whether in Europe or in the Far East or in Africa, the issues of peace or war depended on the efficacy of the League, so much so that the United States and the U.S.S.R. which stood so rigidly aloof in its early years, were inevitably drawn into its orbit, when first Japan and then Germany set out to overthrow the political structure, which had emerged from the Nine Power Treaty and the Paris settlements.

Professor Carr's careful analysis brings out both the strength and the weakness of the League. He shows its capacity to deal effectively and probably justly with disputes such as those between Greece and Bulgaria and between Turkey and Iraq over Mosul, where no Great Power was directly involved, in contrast with its inability to protect Greece from the Italian *coup de force* at Corfu. As long as its moral authority was sufficient to bring about the settlement of disputes by conciliation, the League remained supreme, but as soon as no settlement could be reached without the use of coercion, economic or military, its weakness was exposed.

At the present moment when some not dissimilar situations exist, it is worth re-reading what happened when Japan overran Manchuria in 1931. Through the use of the veto implied in the unanimity rule Japan was able to defeat the resolution calling for the withdrawal of its troops in defiance of the votes of all the other members of the Assembly. None of the great Powers—neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. nor Britain nor France—was prepared either morally or militarily to face the consequences of Japan's flagrant breach of the Covenant and of the Nine Power Treaty, which the Lytton report implied but refrained from proclaiming. Professor Carr rightly regards this as the first fatal turning point on the way back to power-politics and war. As he says, " for the League of Nations . . . the consequences were incalculable. It was difficult to resist the conclusion that members of the League were not prepared to resist an act of aggression committed by a powerful and well-armed state."

From that time onwards the League system disintegrated. In an atmosphere of fear and mistrust disarmament was impossible. Japan's example incited Hitler to repudiate the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty by introducing conscription and the Locarno Treaty by re-occupying the Rhineland, while Mussolini flouted the League by annexing Abyssinia. The rule of law was finished. Power became once more supreme in international affairs, but the democracies were too divided and too lukewarm in their devotion to their own principles to take a resolute stand against the aggressors. Spain, Shanghai, Austria, Munich, Prague, Albania, Poland marked the stages of what now seems an inevitable road to ruin. Under Professor Carr's dispassionate treatment the tragedy of the inter-war period is so plainly depicted that its lessons for the future can hardly be missed.

HAROLD BUTLER.

OUR EVOLVING CIVILISATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GEOPACIFICS, by Griffith Taylor. *Oxford University Press.* 21*s.*

Dr. Griffith Taylor has had an unusually varied experience of the

earth's surface. Born in London, he passed his boyhood in Serbia, was educated in Australia, became senior geologist to Scott's Antarctic expedition; and as Professor of Geography in the Universities of Sydney (1920), Chicago (1928), and Toronto (1935), he made extensive field studies of the geography and climatology of Australia, the U.S.A. and Canada. He has also travelled in Asia, Africa, and South America, and tramped through most European countries. He is of the environmentalist school of geographers, contending that "the presence of coal or of semi-desert grasslands is a stronger factor than are any controls brought about by human cultures or technology."

He regards this book as an introduction to "Geopacifics", which he defines as "an attempt to base the teachings of freedom and humanity upon real geographical deductions." He holds that by describing the wide-spread mixing of races in Europe it shows that conflicts arising from so-called racial differences are "usually absurd", and by its analysis of climatic variations and the distribution of natural resources it encourages mankind to improve the better-endowed parts of the world first instead of wasting efforts in the attempt "to develop difficult terrains . . . ."

Professor Taylor thinks that man and primitive civilization first appeared in south central Asia, near the Caspian sea; and in discussing racial distribution and the spread of culture he employs the "Zones and Strata" technique:

> If there be a centre where evolution is taking place . . . . the various differentiated classes will be found to be arranged in zones . . . . so that the most primitive is at the margins, and the most advanced at the centre of of the series of zones. Thus the earliest class will have covered the greatest area in its migrations, but fossil evidence of this class will be found buried in deepest stratum, under the later strata of the centre of evolution.

He classifies man into five races, in order of appearance: Negritoes, Negroes, Australoids, Mediterraneans—with their variants the Nordics—and Alpines. Discussing the question of race superiority, he contends that what has been called "the biological gap" between East and West has little or no scientific basis. The descent of the net reproduction rate in north-west Europe below the level required for the permanent maintenance of a stationary population he takes as an indication that the Nordic race is in danger of dying out.

The book concludes with a discussion of the post-war peace problems and the future of migration and land settlement. In estimating the potential capacity of the British Dominions to absorb population the author employs a method worked out by him in 1923. He divides Europe into ten more or less homogeneous geographical regions and ascertains how the various population densities respond to differences in temperature, rainfall, coal supply, and other geographical conditions. (He found that the most useful rainfall was about fifty inches, and that a large coal supply doubled the population density). He then assigns to similar regions in other parts of the world the population density values so ascertained, and arrives at the potential population densities of those regions, assuming that the standards of living in the regions will be those of the corresponding regions in Europe. By this method he estimates that Canada could support a population of 100 millions, South Africa one of eighty millions, and Australia one of sixty millions. The corresponding numbers for the U.S.A. and Siberia would be 500 millions and 200 millions respectively. He explains, however, that if we assume that American standards of living will obtain in the non-European regions the potential population numbers should be reduced by one-third or one-half.

The book proceeds from ripe experience and a vast store of knowledge. It is lucid, informative, readable, and provocative. The author holds decided opinions but is not dogmatic. There are those who will strongly dissent from some of his conclusions, but there will surely be few who will

fail to be interested, if not invigorated, by what he says.

G. F. McCLEARY.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SOVIET RUSSIA 1929—1941, by Max Beloff. Volume I. 1929—1936. *Oxford University Press.* 15*s.*

This work, produced under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is in salutary contrast to the indiscretions of retired diplomatists and the collected despatches of newspaper correspondents that constitute the normal fare of those who seek after enlightenment about the policy or practice of Soviet Russia. Both these have their value, but it is none the less refreshing to come to a serious, well-informed, factual appreciation such as Mr. Beloff's book contains. It is true, as Lord Astor points out in his Preface, that: "There does not exist, in English at any rate, a scholarly, coherent, and comprehensive account of the evolution of Soviet foreign policy between the Revolution of 1917 and the Soviet Union's entry into the war in 1941." Part of this gap this book very adequately fills.

The period before 1929 was characterized by a considerable but diminishing measure of isolation on the part of Russia from the outside world, coupled with the gradual abandonment of Russia's plans for immediate world revolution. By 1929 the policy of "Socialism in one country" was firmly established. "The objectives which the Soviet leaders pursued in the new period," (that is, after 1929) Mr. Beloff notes, "remained basically unaltered; to seek friendly contacts with powers who could assist in the economic upbuilding of the Soviet Union; to prevent the creation of a great anti-Soviet bloc of the imperialist-capitalist powers, and to extend the security system entered into with the Soviet Union's neighbours as an added obstacle to a new war of intervention."

The first of these objectives was necessitated, and the mode of giving effect to it largely governed, by the Five Year Plan. In order to buy machines or materials that her own industrial development demanded, Russia was willing to sell her products at a price that for the producers of other countries would have been wholly uneconomic; a procedure that producers of like commodities would have resented at any time but which in the economic conditions of the early 'thirties was sometimes catastrophic in its consequences.

It becomes clear from Mr. Beloff's book that the pursuit of the first objective tended to confuse and frustrate the pursuit of the second and third. This tendency was particularly marked in the history of Russo-German relations. The importance of German trade, coupled with the traditional Communist contempt for the moral element in politics, led the framers of Soviet policy into a complete misunderstanding of the significance of the rise of the Nazis. In the early days the Communists, with fatuous complacency, regarded the Nazis as valuable allies in overthrowing the régime of the German Centre and Social Democrats. It was not until Hitler had been in power for a considerable period, and Germany's re-armament had restricted her export of machine tools, that this illusion was dispelled, and the period of co-operation with the League of Nations and the Western Powers began. The mutual distrust animating both parties limited the usefulness of this from the start, and led to Munich and the Russo-German Pact of August 1939—developments to be discussed in a later volume. The later period ended, as this earlier period began, with the Russians going for a ride on the German tiger; a policy whose short-sightedness nearly involved the Soviet Union in ruin.

The rulers of Russia to-day, although some new stars have arisen, are to a large extent the same as during the period with which this book deals; and in so far as it throws light on their underlying motives in the early 'thirties it will help us to understand their policy in the late 'forties; but this is a scientific work and therefore is more concerned

to pose the right questions than to provide answers to them, and the reader of these pages will find no ready-made solutions to his problems. There are, none the less, some significant clues; for example, the similarity between the language with which Soviet propagandists attacked the protagonists of European union in the days of Aristide Briand and that with which they denounce the Marshall Plan of to-day. Then, as now, a strong and prosperous Europe means for them a Europe that is rich in potential and well-provided enemies. But none could tell from this book whether the basic cause of this attitude is defensive or aggressive; a compliment to Mr. Beloff's book and not a criticism of it. Every student of modern Europe should read this valuable and enlightening book.

W. T. Wells.

MINORITIES IN THE ARAB WORLD, by A. H. Hourani. *Oxford University Press.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

This is a comprehensive analysis of the *macedoine* of minorities in the Middle East. Some are Moslem; others Christian; others again Jews and there are also the Yazidis, the Mandaeans, the Shabak and the Bahais. Mr. Hourani has tackled his subject country by country and there are chapters on Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, the Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, each with a scholarly picture of the importance, characteristics and problems of the local minorities supported by statistical tables of their numbers and domiciles. The remaining chapters concern the origins of the different minorities and their histories and adventures up to 1946 and also the author's own thoughtful conclusions as to their ultimate destinies.

One of his conclusions is very pertinent to-day. He discusses the essential need for the Middle East majority (Moslem) and minorities to form, if possible, a "community" to be held together under the magnetism of "a creative idea which is stronger than nationalism in its hold on men's imaginations." His conclusion is that "Communism alone has the universality of extension, the supernatural source and sanction which can override human distinctions and hold together diverse communities in a common task."

Mr. Hourani's book was issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and bears the unmistakable hallmark of a commissioned handbook. As such it will certainly find a deserved place on the Middle East shelves of many public and private libraries and, with its useful maps and excellent index, will be an authoritative book of reference for research students. But as it has been shaped and written, it is far too heavy for the general public. That is a pity. For there is a public for a book of the kind Mr. Hourani has not yet written.

In his foreword, however, he has described his book as "a tentative introduction to a subject which has not yet been dealt with fully and objectively." Does this modesty mean that he may be contemplating a longer and more popular volume from perhaps a less objective standpoint? That way he would meet an interested public. His handbook has all the facts, the bare bones. What is needed is the flesh to clothe them. And who better than Mr. Hourani—now a proved expert—to bring to life a story which, as he has told it tentatively and objectively, is still inanimate?

And if he responds to this encouragement, perhaps he would add a chapter or two about the coming national social reform programmes which are now in contemplation by all the Middle East countries whose minority problems he has covered. These programmes are, of course, primarily conceived for the Moslem majority in each country; but it would be interesting to hear from Mr. Hourani how he thinks that, in particular, the Christian minorities with their higher standards of living and education would fit into a scheme of social security designed mainly for Moslems.

Owen Tweedy.

CHINA AWAKE, by Robert Payne. *Heinemann.* 15*s.*

CHINESE CRACKERS, by Edward Ward. *Bodley Head.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

BURMESE FAMILY, by Mi Mi Khaing. *Longmans.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

Halfway between the other two authors, Robert Payne has dwelt for several years among his Chinese students, whereas Edward Ward's stay in China was comparatively brief and Mi Mi Khaing is herself Burmese.

One often finds that those who stay for too long in a country or for too brief a period are not the best fitted as authorities and certainly in Robert Payne we have an admirable guide who loves the country of which he writes, but is not afraid to see its faults. Much of his book deals with Wen Yi-tuo, a great scholar who half guessed he would be killed, and this meant nothing to him so long as his great country survived.

Katherine Mansfield wrote, as Robert Payne observes, with the sharpness of a blue-bird's wing. He, too, writes very much in that manner. " The lightning reared above the mountains," he tells us of a storm, " the rain emptied itself; everything blue, silver or jet-black, the lake the clearest imaginable blue. And afterwards, when we were shuddering and licking our wounds, the memory of the clear colours of lightning . . ." In another place : " The stars came out white and clear, so many that the sky was like an immense bridal veil, not silver but pure white sheets flowing in waves across the sky, and softly undulating, a night so unlike other nights that it seemed as though it had come upon the earth for the first time. And the trees were smaller than ever, and the lake was dead black, having no existence because only the sky was alive. In this clearness with the end of the wars in sight, what auguries are foretold ? " It is obvious how greatly the author loves China ; his is indeed a memorable book.

Vivid sketches enliven the pages of Edward Ward of the B.B.C. He tells of an entire party of Japanese prisoners kneeling down silently and the Commando corporal, who had his own ideas about how to make Japanese prisoners work, asking what they were doing. " Praying," said the interpreter, " that they will never have to work for anybody like you again." Among the excellent illustrations of this book is one of a Shanghai street in which are suspended paper ' taels ' which the Chinese buy and offer to the gods in place of the genuine silver taels, believing the deities to be so stupid that they cannot tell the difference. On the other hand it appears that if you are a knowledgeable person, sitting down to a Yunnanese meal, you will ask for a spiced ham which is said to be incomparably better than any other ham, even those of Prague or the peach-fed ones of Georgia. A traveller like Edward Ward is sure to fall in with picturesque fellow-travellers, for instance with such as the Chinese captain who, with a guard, had been detailed to act as escort to Mr. Ward and his companions in a train. Suddenly the little captain enquired of our author whether he ever wrote love letters ; he himself was very depressed because no one ever sent them to him. He therefore got up, walked down to the end of the coach and began singing a mournful song in a high falsetto. He continued with this solidly for half an hour and then he executed a little dance. On the way one could buy chickens which were carried round in glass boxes at all the stations, cold, roast and varnished a vivid red, forbidding to look at but excellent to eat.

The high-class Burmese girl who has written our third book has a good deal to say about the food of her native land, as well as of her relatives, such as her grandfather who refused to learn English, " this irreligious language," as he called it. One of her uncles got the maids in his house to acquire modern songs to the accompaniment of which he dressed himself ; it was the duty of one of the girls to get under the table and fan the mosquitoes off the legs of the family. We obtain a thorough insight into the Burmese mode of life and the illustrations are equally attractive.

HENRY BARRLEIN.

BOOKS ON THE TABLE

HITHERTO it has not occurred to me that a dignitary's lot might be a target either for envy or for scorn. This shocking indifference has now given place to a lively gratitude that not being an archbishop leaves me free to say that the reading of SOVIET SUCCESS by Hewlett Johnson (*Hutchinson.* 10*s.* 6*d.*) was an exhilarating experience. The Dean of Canterbury depicts a people,

> one-time economic serfs and spiritual helots slowly arising to their gallant task of building a new civilization upon foundations of substantial economic equality and freedom, and sadly hampered by the defects of their inherited past, stumbling on a difficult road, committing blunders,

set back by war ravages such as the Americans and the British have never known. To light the sombreness of the painful rebuilding of pre-war accomplishment, there is the joy of the common man in the task ; his sense of vocation, of sharing an ideal, shines through all miseries. Having closely studied family life, and educational, health, cultural and industrial facilities in the Soviet Union, the Dean now speaks as he recently found. Illustrated by many photographs, this record of a world of ordinary folk who are enduring hardships because they believe that thus their children will have civilized advantages as a birthright, might serve as an inspiration to that other, western world whose fears cause it to concentrate only on Russian foreign policy.

European defeats

It might also take a good look at RUSSIAN ZONE by Gordon Schaffer (*Allen & Unwin.* 10*s.* 6*d.*) which deals, to use the author's own words, " at the outset with some of the more irresponsible criticisms." This he does with the aid of statistics, and end-paper maps to signpost the reader, and then assesses the positive achievement of Russian occupation. Mr. Schaffer is, of course, not concerned with the other Zones, but to one who has heard and read from just as reputable sources of the unsatisfactoriness of some facets of British, American and French occupation behaviour, his book does at least supply the cold comfort that the Russians are no worse at a difficult job than the others.

One victory exalts

> another corrupts. One defeat kills, another brings life. Tell me what seed is lodged in your victory or your defeat, and I will tell you your future,

said Antoine de Saint-Exupéry. LEAVES IN THE STORM, edited with a running commentary by Stefan Schimanski and Henry Treece (*Lindsay Drummond.* 10*s.* 6*d.*) shows the problematical seed in process of germination. It was a bright thought which prompted this collection of extracts from the diaries of thirty-four writers covering the years 1939-1945 ; for in grim days of world readjustment a reminder of what men and women expected from their fight for victory is timely. These entries, ranging through Stephen Spender's September 1939 journal, Robert Herring's notebook of the 1940 raids, William Sansom's 1941 fireman's journal, Patricia Ledward's days in the life of a nurse in 1942, Howard Clewes' 1943 Tunisian diary, and Erik de Mauny's Italian notebook of 1944 press on to the inevitable cynicism : " The world was supposed to be free—and nobody believed it," with the rider that man has still the choice of his end or his beginning as a gleam of hope.

Light and shade

How much longer Switzerland will be allowed to go her way in a quarrelsome world is not clear. Her special kind of peace and Llewelyn Powys' special kind of personality permeate and enrich his SWISS ESSAYS (*John Lane The Bodley Head.* 15*s.*). This is his last book, finished just before his death at Clavadel in 1939. Together with the wonderful photographic studies of H. Rivers Pollock and the publishers' unstinting format, the volume is a worthy memorial to a remarkable man. Full of praise for the beauties of nature, the essays spill over into praise of men and children too ; the sunshine on the spruces, across the

valleys and in the heart of Llewelyn Powys warms and colours every sentence.——Though the illness that killed him is as old as civilization, the tubercle bacillus was only discovered in the 1880's. An account of it may be read in THE STORY OF SURGERY by George Bankoff (*Arthur Barker.* 12*s.* 6*d.*) which goes back to the flint for the first surgical instrument and traces the hard way along which the pioneers and their successors travelled. This being the history of the struggle against man's ignorance, cruelty, superstition and credulity, and though written by a Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons, is no mere text book. In fact, the healthy layman is promised a journey through the jungles of disease where every step is informative and absorbing.

Laughing at life

Joyce Conyngham Green takes a journey through the year in SALMAGUNDI (*J. M. Dent.* 15*s.*). As the title is the old name for *hors d'oeuvres* made " according to your fancy " it fits this calendar journal of quotations for each month and the author's comments on recipes, gardening, folk lore custom, visitors of both kinds, and the hundred and one doings of country life—though it must be confessed that the exceedingly urban activities of Mr. William Gunter, rivetted the attention of one for whom ' tea at Gunter's ' is blissful memory of special occasions. The book is full of sagacity, light-hearted, often comic, and every page has its eye-capturing incident. The ugliness of the jacket belies the black and white illustrations of Antony Lake which decorate and complement the interior.—— The man who wished to be a serious illustrator but who was driven by his ever-appreciative public to draw ' conraptions ' is now portrayed in THE LIFE AND ART OF W. HEATH ROBINSON by Langston Day (*Herbert Joseph.* 25*s.*) The popular conception of the crazy inventor type is unsupported here. The story is of a painstaking craftsman, who excelled in many forms of draughtsmanship (witness the tender beauty of the *Twelfth Night* pictures), who loved country rambles and whose sanity was the joy and solace of his friends. His admirers will revel in the reproductions of both serious and funny work. Perhaps the terms are interchangeable, for the man who caricatured machinery so funnily, that is, so aptly, must have been able to do so through an apprehension of the serious dangers of mechanization, of the growing power of the machine over man.

Choir boy and Injuns

Unaccompanied by W. Heath Robinson, Hermon Ould opens SHUTTLE : An Autobiographical Sequence (*Andrew Dakers.* 15*s.*) with a contemplation of " the wonder of modern machinery, its complexity, its efficiency, its reliability," as exemplified in the power loom, with memory for a shuttle. This does not work in chronological order but " dodges in and out " to such effect that the pattern of a full and varied life is neatly woven. Some of the threads are his choir boy period, his solo work with the Moore and Burgess Minstrels, his City office rôle, his experience as a playwright in 1913, his pacifism in 1914-1918 and his distinguished connection with P.E.N. and its author members. This is not a book for dipping into and the author insures against the possibility by giving no chapter titles, page headings and index.—— Far away, as far away indeed as Enid, Oklahoma, is from Tower Hill, London, another boy was weaving his pattern of life. THE CHEROKEE STRIP by Marquis James (*Phoenix House.* 12*s.* 6*d.*) tells of the claim staked by his father in the Indian lands which have since become part of Oklahoma. There are Indians, cattle drives, newspapers edited and printed by the same man, gold prospectors, Rangers—everything in fact that made frontier, and American, history, and only fifty years away. When American journalists recreate their memories well, they do it very well indeed (that boy over in the East at Baltimore had already begun his) and it is difficult to put this book down until

the last page when the author is bound for the pastures new of Kansas City. And he must not stop the story here.

The lonely child

The next American boy is CHRISTOPHER by Josephine Eckert (*Hammond, Hammond.* 8*s.* 6*d.*). This is a novel, but the child of nearly nine stands for all real boys of the sensitive sort. So fully is the adult allowed to enter his mind that the logicality of his actions in a world of mostly uncomprehending grown ups is accepted without question. The grown ups are seen too through the eyes of the child and are clear cut, especially the father and most of all dear Binkie, the poet. Susanna is rather too whimsical with witchcraft, but little girls in fiction, as in life, often seem to lack the appeal of their male contemporaries; there is a single-mindedness, an unselfconscious attention to the job in hand, about most small boys which their little sisters usually lose too soon. Christopher is wholly lovable, and credible as well, and deserves that his father's unlikely transition from the disciplinary to the imaginative as the book closes should be permanent.

Great imagination

The Father of the English Novel is the subject of HENRY FIELDING by Elizabeth Jenkins, (*Home & Van Thal.* 6*s.*) and of A TRUE-BORN ENGLISHMAN by M. P. Willcocks (*George Allen & Unwin.* 15*s.*). Contemplating a pair of biographies was dismaying, but the actual consecutive reading of them has proved no hardship. They dovetail admirably and corroborate each other, not necessarily in unison but rather as if they were a perfectly harmonized duet. Each shows evidence of careful research and their main difference is that the second, being much the bigger volume, naturally goes into greater detail. For many, Fielding comes into the category of "those we *should* love" and the books provide an opportunity to get beyond the typical eighteenth century coarseness to the essential man. The studies of *Tom Jones* are an obvious example: they analyse one of the greatest of novels, discuss Fielding's theories, contained in the prefaces, on the art of writing, and supply evidence of his great powers of character delineation.

and great critical power

"Here's richness!" James Agate would have said of Fielding's critical gifts. THOSE WERE THE NIGHTS (*Hutchinson.* 15*s.*) is an anthology of criticism from 1880-1906 selected by him from a collection of newspaper cuttings sent by an anonymous donor in 1940. Some will be assailed by the familiar ache that comes of reading an Agate collection, that Irving, Ellen Terry and a few more were not here later. On the other hand, those who will ache because they were in time must derive the greatest enjoyment from these little re-creations of the giants. Of the letters, on theatre matters sent to the press, the gem seems to be Oscar Wilde's protest to the editor of the *Daily Telegraph* that he had been misquoted. It is a misfortune that the last paragraph, containing his praise of puppets, is too long to quote: how some live actors must have been stung through the honey!

And so to bed

in the company of Edward Sackville-West's album, compiled from his B.B.C. feature bearing that title (*Phoenix House.* 12*s.* 6*d.*), which was a wartime five-minute late night reading of poetry and prose. It is obvious that such an anthologist would avoid the too obvious or the hackneyed and his aim, to bar masterpieces found in other anthologies, has largely succeeded. As with all books of this type, there is opportunity to speculate about the exclusion or inclusion of certain pieces, and it should be said that *And So To Bed* stands such ponderings better than most.——Another collection which might go into position on the bedside table is Gloria Komai's little group of poems NEVER DESPAIR OF GARDENS (*Sylvan Press.* 3*s.* 6*d.*). All her work breathes quietness, in contemplation of nature; here is "oil for the wounds of Europe".

GRACE BANYARD.

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